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A GENERAL FRAMEWORK FOR CHARACTERIZING AND EVALUATING
ATTACKER MODELS FOR CPS SECURITY ASSESSMENT
Abstract
by Christopher Stephen-James Deloglos, B.S.
Virginia Commonwealth University
December 2021
Associate Professor: Carl Elks
Characterizing the attacker’s perspective is essential to assessing the security posture and re-
silience of cyber-physical systems. The attacker’s perspective is most often achieved by cyber-
security experts (e.g., red teams) who critically challenge and analyze the system from an adversarial
stance.
Unfortunately, the knowledge and experience of cyber-security experts can be inconsistent lead-
ing to situations where there are gaps in the security assessment of a given system. Structured se-
curity review processes (such as TAM [1], Mission Aware [2], STPA-SEC [3], and STPA-SafeSec [4])
attempt to standardize the review processes to impart consistency across an organization or appli-
cation domain. However, with most security review processes, the attackers’ perspectives are ad hoc
and often lack structure. Attacker modeling is a potential solution but there is a lack of uniformity
in published literature and a lack of structured methods to integrate the attacker perspective into
established security review processes.
This dissertation proposes a generalized framework for characterizing and evaluating attacker
models for CPS security assessment. We developed this framework from a structured literature
survey on attacker model characteristics which we used to create an ontology of attacker models
from a context of security assessment. This generalized framework facilitates the characterization
and functional representation of attacker models, leveraged in a novel scalable integration workflow.
This workflow leverages an intermediate functional representation module to integrate attacker
models into a security review process. In conclusion, we demonstrate the efficacy of our attacker
modeling framework through a use case in which we integrate an attacker model into an established
security review process.
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Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs) is broadly recognized as the field of technology that integrates cyber
operations with physical systems through the use of sensory equipment and controls technology.
Where the pre-CPS era was primarily defined by isolated embedded systems interacting with
the physical world, the integration of cooperating embedded systems composed of control, networks,
sensory, autonomy, and human interaction components gave rise to the realm of CPSs. The power
of CPSs has been realized and embraced as they are deployed across the technological spectrum.
From military and national defense interests to utility infrastructures such as energy, manufacturing,
transportation, and communication. Even to manufacturing environments and consumer products,
CPSs have become the rule where they used to be the exception.
Cyber-physical systems have evolved as the security challenges of networked and connected
environments become more commonplace in the CPS domain. While cyber-physical systems re-
ceive a public view of being commonplace, the transition into an integrated world has been riddled
with challenges for many industries where Information Technology (IT) and Operational Technol-
ogy (OT) have historically been separate. The origins of cyber-physical systems precluding their
rise to prevalence are in operational technology where blanket security schemes mitigated security
requirements, now commonly referred to as perimeter-based security techniques [15]. Techniques
such as air-gapping or otherwise separating operational technology networks from the connected
and integrated information technology networks [16] allowed the benefits of cyber-physical systems
to be realized without inheriting the security risks of information technology.
As technology continued to advance, the requirements for cyber-physical systems resulted in
modifications and advancements to the technology to meet the needs of more complicated processes
with more automation and less dependence on physical orientation and proximity. The benefits of
integrating IT and OT pushed cyber-physical systems further and further into the networked realm,
which introduced vulnerabilities and threats to the OT world that hitherto were irrelevant.
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Cyber technologies evolved in an environment of hackers and security awareness, quickly adapt-
ing to the changing threat landscape. Cyber-physical technologies, however, were developed on the
foundations of long-term reliability and safety and tended to adapt much slower [17]. Power grids,
communication systems, and other critical public infrastructures, for example, are designed for
long-term safety and reliability, and the rapid ecosystem of security management with regular soft-
ware patches and hardware vulnerability remediation does not integrate well into this slow-moving
environment [16].
Compounding the urgency of the cyber-physical systems security issue is that violations of
security in a CPS can have physical consequences - resulting in dangerous or unsafe behavior.
Where cyber-attacks can only cause physical damage indirectly, cyber-physical attacks have the
potential to cause injury or loss of life by direct physical means. As a field, cyber-physical security
inherits the challenges and traits of cyber-security and must expand those to meet the physical
safety and security requirements. The interdependence between physical safety and software-based
safety and security is at the center of the cyber-physical universe and drove CPS security research
in the face of emerging threats.
1.2 Motivation
The dangers of cyber-physical security threats are significant and have been demonstrated across
many industries. In 2000, the sewage system of the Maroochy Shire Council in Queensland, Aus-
tralia, became the target of one of the first publicly reported SCADA (Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition) system attacks [18]. In the attack, a contractor used a personal computer to mimic a
pumping station using radios and stolen SCADA software. The attacker reportedly released more
than 750,000 gallons of sewage water into public spaces, resulting in $176,000 of damages to the
city council and $500,000 of expenses to the contractor.
In 2005, the Athens affair [19] showed again how hacking computing resources could lead to
unexpected and significant losses in the real world. While the Athens affair was, strictly speaking, a
cyber-attack, it laid the foundations for understanding the consequences of integrating hardware and
software systems. In the Athens Affair, Greece’s largest cellular service provider (Vodafone Greece)
was infiltrated when attackers reprogrammed their network switches to redirect and record phone
calls. The provider, who was unauthorized to perform wire-tapping at the time, upgraded their
infrastructure to handle their growing technological needs and installed fuller-featured equipment
with unused wire-tapping capabilities. Hackers that remain unidentified to this day were able to
exploit this unused feature to redirect phone calls from over 100 high-profile victims, including the
prime minister of Greece and his wife, the ministers of justice, foreign affairs, and national defense,
and a myriad of other politicians, embassy workers, and activists. The consequences of the attack
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were extensive, including a $76 million fine to the service provider and a suicide alleged to be a
result of the wire-tapping. However, no audio recordings were ever discovered.
Examples of the dangers of cyber-attacks in cyber-physical industries did not take long to man-
ifest and include [20]–[26]. In 2010, the Stuxnet worm [27] became a center of attention in CPS
security. It demonstrated the susceptibility of a safety-critical CPS-based Industrial Control System
(ICS) to cyber-attacks of a new category of complexity. The Stuxnet worm infected an air-gapped
network in an Iranian nuclear fuel refinement plant, causing damage to refinement centrifuges and
crippling the plant operation for several months before it was discovered. This worm succeeded by
exploiting both known and zero-day vulnerabilities and taking advantage of operator process defi-
ciencies to enter the ICS, then propagating laterally through the ICS to its target system. Stuxnet
revealed inadequacies in blanket security approaches such as air-gapping or assuming complete op-
erator process control, prompting a need for refined security processes during industrial control
systems’ design, development, and operation. In particular, Stuxnet revealed a need for security
assessment methods that account for a broad set of threat actors, even as they continue to evolve
and adapt.
As the need for process automation continues to grow, so does the scope and magnitude of CPS
attacks, and so do the predictions of CPS attack severity and frequency. While financial projections
are skeptical at best, Gartner in [28] predicts that the damages from fatality-related CPS incidents
will reach over $50 billion by 2023. On December 23rd, 2015, hackers performed a coordinated
assault on three Ukrainian power distribution centers, taking 30 substations offline and leaving
over 230,000 individuals without power, including the power distribution centers whose backup
generators were taken offline as a step in the attack. This attack became unique when the attackers
reprogrammed the firmware on several of the serial-to-ethernet converters at the substations to
inhibit engineers from remotely re-booting the substations. As an added measure, the attackers
launched a DDoS (Distributed Denial of Service) attack that took out the power company’s call
centers to inhibit customer communication. The attack reportedly was in effect for six hours until
engineers could manually bring all 30 substations back online.
In summary, the threats against cyber-physical systems are real, the consequences are severe,
and cyber-physical systems are only getting more advanced, integrated, and complicated. From
ransomware operators seeking to make an income to hacktivists, terrorists, and nation-states playing
for cyber dominance, the threat actors against cyber-physical systems are dangerous and constantly
adapting to subvert security measures.
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1.3 A Problem and a Potential Solution
Despite a boom of security research targeting the CPS field, the evidence suggests a significant
disparity between state of the art in literature and state of the art in practice. In a 2021 pub-
lication [16], Jamil performed a study of security practices being employed in various CPS-based
industries and found that the methods and techniques applied to security assurance fell far short of
the security research available for those technologies. At the core of this problem, Jamil identified
threat modeling practices to be notably lacking. Jamil states, "most of the participants do not use
quality assurance techniques for the threat models that they produce and depend on the experience
and skills of the expert who performs the threat model " [16]. To put this statement in context,
most participants in the study cited STRIDE [29] as their guiding threat model, which was born
in the IT world of cyber security and has no concept of the physical environment, physical threats,
or physical consequences. This study demonstrates a significant disparity between the tools and
resources available for cyber-physical security experts and the means employed in the field. This
disparity becomes even more apparent when considering the common practice of assigning IT pro-
fessionals to OT security jobs without the training and experience to understand the complexities
that physical components bring to the security challenge [16].
In both cyber and cyber-physical security, the challenges of comprehensive security assurance
have facilitated the practice of red/blue teaming. This practice shifts the focus of the assessment by
splitting the security review into two teams pursuing the same security goal by different means. The
purpose of the blue team is to demonstrate system security through security assurance practices,
often involving semi-formal security review processes. The goal of the red team is to ensure system
security by proving the absence of system vulnerabilities by attacking the system and identifying
existing vulnerabilities so that the blue team can remove them. This makes the operations of red
teams critically dependent on their ability to identify and emulate threats as they try to adopt the
attacker’s perspective [30].
One of the critical factors that can limit the abilities of the red team is not having appropriate
models to reason about the attacker consistently. Classical security assessment relies on red-team
security experts to analyze a system and identify vulnerabilities and is limited by the extent of the
experts’ knowledge and experience. A lack of methods to guide and inform the security assessment
results in ad hoc threat modeling practices with inconsistent results. Experts such as Adam Shostack
strongly advocate against practices that require security experts to "think like an attacker" in favor
of more structured and formal methods [31]. Progressive security practices challenge the expec-
tation that a security professional will be able to effectively or efficiently postulate the behavioral
characteristics of a largely unknown threat actor [32]–[34]. In the 2020 publication [34], Moeckel
interviewed twelve senior-level security management officials and identified this type of ’thinking
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like the attacker’ as a common practice.
Jamil asserts in [16] that in practice, the lack of quality assurance for threat models leads to
a lack of confidence in these ad hoc threat models generated by security experts. He states, "The
managers sometimes request threat models for their CPSs from more than one expert." While a
diversity of expert opinion is a potential solution, it does not solve the bigger problem: the lack
of confidence in expert opinion undermines security assurance. The threat models used in security
review processes need to be bolstered with more formal threat modeling practices.
Similarly, security review processes used by blue teams share a common underlying principle:
they require the security expert to inform the review process of the nature of an attacker. This may
be observed explicitly, such as in a HAZCAD [35] analysis process where the security expert defines
what the goals of the attacker would be at a high level, or implicitly such as in a STRAT analysis
where the security expert associates risk levels with each vulnerability, implicitly quantifying metrics
such as the likelihood of attack via a vulnerability or probability of attack success for an attacker
exploiting that vulnerability.
In summary, any expert-driven threat analysis is limited by the expert and may fail where the
expert’s knowledge or experience falls short. Several promising solutions exist to enhance different
aspects of security assessment. Security review processes add consistency in the methods, principles,
and assumptions used to analyze and review a CPS [1], [4], [15], [36], [37]. Vulnerability databases
and search engines provide consistency in assessing known, context-agnostic vulnerabilities for CPS
components [38]–[42]. By contrast, despite the existence of attacker modeling literature, there is a
significant lack of research in integrating attacker models into security review processes to aid se-
curity experts in the assessment of the attacker and in understanding how the attacker assessment
impacts the security review process. Despite increasing formalism behind the security review pro-
cess and vulnerability assessment techniques, the critical component of analyzing attacker behavior
is often not addressed, undermining security assurance and limiting the quality of the attacker
assessment to the knowledge and experience of red-team and blue-team security experts.
Attacker behavioral modeling has received much attention as its field of research apart from
integration with security review processes. Attacker models (AMs) present solutions for various
security challenges, including those prompted by security review processes of reasoning about at-
tacker behavior and identifying how that behavior influences the security assessment. Despite the
availability and utility of attacker models, in application, they are rarely integrated into red-team
and blue-team security review processes due to the following challenges.
• Attacker models are challenging to understand due to inconsistency in definition and structure.
• The assumptions made by attacker models are challenging to identify when not explicitly
documented.
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• Misalignment of critical assumptions between attacker models and security review processes
makes integration infeasible.
• Functionally integrating attacker models into security review processes requires significant
manual effort.
For the benefits of attacker modeling research to be fully realized and transitioned into prac-
tice, methods need to be devised to understand and integrate attacker models into security review
processes performed in real-world applications. We propose a generalized attacker modeling frame-
work that is structured to comprehend all attacker models and a workflow to guide attacker model
integration into a security review process.
1.4 Research Objectives and Value Propositions
This research aims to aid in the realization of the benefits of attacker models by developing a gen-
eralized framework for understanding attacker models and introducing attacker modeling methods
and practices into security review processes.
To achieve this, we performed a broad literature review of attacker modeling research and
security assessment research to develop a modular Attacker Modeling Framework (AMF) that aids
in defining, understanding, and applying attacker models. This framework is composed of two
primary modules. The first module is called the Attacker Model Characterization (AMC). It is
a generalized semi-formal method for describing attacker models and characterizing the attributes
that make them unique for application in security review processes. The second module is called
the Attacker Model Functional Representation (AMFR) and is a generalized semi-formal method
for capturing the functional implementation of an attacker model. This research was developed
using a systems approach to fully understand the domain of attacker modeling to create a more
general attacker modeling framework that can be used for quantifying attacker model assessment
for security review processes.
While we demonstrate the utility and value of each of the AMF modules on their own, the
novelty of the attacker modeling framework truly lies in how we leverage these modules together
to facilitate selecting and integrating attacker models into security review processes. In developing
our attacker modeling framework, we recognized the gap between the attacker modeling community
and the security assessment community and the need to bridge this gap by making a framework
that is accessible to both. From the perspective of the attacker modeling community, our framework
recognizes the need for attacker modeling experts to understand the characteristics of their attacker
models that are uniquely valuable to security assessment research and know how their attacker
models functionally integrate with security review processes. To do this, our AMF aids the attacker
model researcher in characterizing and describing their attacker model in a manner that is accessible
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and valuable to the security assessment community. Our AMF breaks down the attacker model into
an ontology composed of the subset of attacker model characteristics critical to integration with
security review processes. Our framework also identifies the relationship of information exchanged
between attacker models and security review processes and how the attributes of the attacker model
influence their compatibility with and their value to those security review processes.
From the perspective of the security assessment community, our framework recognizes the chal-
lenges involved with achieving a quantitative assessment of attacker models and identifying the
characteristics and attributes that influence the compatibility and value provided by attacker mod-
els. To do this, we develop a systematic and semi-formal process that can be used by security
experts to document, evaluate, and integrate attacker models into security review processes. This
framework aids the expert in predicting the utility and effort for integration of different attacker
models. We also recognize that the security community is heavily influenced by the cost and effort
associated with developing security practices and that the effort required for using our attacker
modeling framework must be reasonable and scalable for it to be a valuable solution. As such, we
developed our attacker modeling framework with a concept of hierarchical abstraction, where we
leverage the information available at higher levels of attacker model abstraction first to minimize
the manual effort required throughout the integration process. Then we progress to lower levels of
abstraction as the results and scope of attacker model assessment narrow toward the perspective of
the security review process.
Another valuable aspect of this AMF is that we develop and demonstrate it in the context
of a systems-based workflow where we use tabular documentation schemes to capture data in a
manner conducive to data utilization. This was influenced by the documentation schemes commonly
employed by semi-formal security review processes familiar with the requirements of large-scale
analyses and optimizing the organization and accessibility of information.
In conclusion to this work, we demonstrate the application of the attacker modeling framework
in an integration case study using an established security review process developed by the Electric
Power Research Institute (EPRI) called the Technical Assessment Methodology (TAM) [1]. In this
case study, we identify a component of the security assessment process that the inclusion of an
attacker model may aid. We then compile a diverse set of attacker models with broadly different
characteristics and purposes, use the attacker modeling framework to identify valuable attacker
models, and integrate a single selected attacker model into the TAM.
1.5 Contributions
The primary contribution of this work is that it bridges the gap between attacker modeling research
and actual practices of CPS attacker assessment. Different attacker models boast a wide range of
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functionality and capabilities and can be of utility to security review processes in many different
ways. The novel work of this dissertation in making a bridge between attacker models and security
review processes realizes the value of existing attacker models, making them accessible for real-world
application. Tangibly, the contribution of this dissertation includes:
1. A structured review on CPS attacker models and the core principles that contribute to inte-
gration with security review processes
2. The development of a deep and broad body of knowledge on attacker models that is generalized
and can describe a wide diversity of attacker models
3. A deconstruction of attacker models into an ontology that captures the characteristics of
attacker models that are critical to integration with security review processes
4. The design of a modular attacker modeling framework for objectively characterizing cyber-
physical systems attacker models
5. The creation of a workflow for integrating the attacker model into any compatible security
review process
6. A case study demonstrating the utility of the attacker modeling frameworks
1.6 Research Road Map
In Chapter 1, we introduce the critical issues surrounding CPS security. We identify the need for
including well-formed attacker models in security review processes and identify the challenges that
have inhibited their utilization thus far. This chapter proposes our attacker modeling framework
and describes its value to attacker modeling research and integrating attacker models into security
review processes.
Chapter 2 provides a literature review of attacker modeling, CPS security review processes, and
the core composing topics. It identifies the research performed thus far as well as gaps in the existing
literature.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of our AMF, describes the process used to develop it, and lays
the foundations for how the various components of our AMF work together to achieve its collective
goals.
Chapter 4 dives into the first of the two components of the attacker modeling framework, the
attacker model characterization (AMC). It describes the composition of the AMC, the various
attributes defined in it, how to use it, and finally demonstrates and documents the application of
the AMC to several attacker models.
Chapter 5 dives into the second of the two components of the attacker modeling framework,
the attacker model functional representation (AMFR). In this chapter, we describe the various
components of the AMFR, present and discuss the semi-formal notation used to represent the
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AMFR, and finally, demonstrate the creation of AMFRs for several different attacker models. In
the early stages of this dissertation research, we developed and published our own attacker model
to address a specific gap in attacker modeling research. At the end of this chapter, we describe that
attacker model in detail and discuss in parallel how the various characteristics of the attacker model
influence the creation of the AMFR for that attacker model.
Chapter 6 describes our semi-formal workflow for evaluating, selecting, and integrating attacker
models into security review processes. We discuss our developed scoring methods, structured evalu-
ation methods, and documentation schemes and identify how scalability and abstraction contribute
to a valuable integration process with reasonable effort.
In Chapter 7, we demonstrate the utility of our attacker modeling framework in a use case where
we identify a potential use for attacker models in EPRI’s Technical Assessment Methodology [1],
evaluate several attacker models, and integrate one into the TAM.
Finally, in Chapter 8, we provide our conclusions. We summarize the research performed, our




Attacker modeling is a composite topic, integrating research from several aspects of cyber and cyber-
physical systems modeling and security. This dissertation is only possible due to work completed in
establishing a background in topics such as formal and semi-formal methods of security assurance,
attacker modeling, attack modeling, CPS modeling, vulnerability analysis, and attacker-CPS inter-
action modeling. An overview of related contributing literature is discussed in this chapter, as well
as our structured literature survey of attacker models.
2.1 The State of Cyber-Physical Systems Security
Information technology (IT) and operational technology (OT) are well-established in academic re-
search and industrial application. In composition, cyber-security application to physical process
automation represents a relatively young field and requires more than the sum of the parts to un-
derstand. Information technology can be defined as "the technology involving the development,
maintenance, and use of computer systems, software, and networks for the processing and distribu-
tion of data " [43]. IT infrastructure’s networked and integrated environment results in a complicated
threat space, which has been the driving force behind the development of cyber-security practices
since the invention of the internet. A review of the evolution of threats and cyber-security prac-
tices in IT systems is deserving of several dissertations and books on its own. Well-received in the
cyber-security field, a representation of the evolution of cyber attacks and threats can be found in
Bruce Middleton’s 2017 publication, "A History of Cyber Security Attacks: 1980 to Present" [44].
The Merriam-Webster dictionary describes operational technology as "Hardware and software
that detects or causes a change, through the direct monitoring and/or control of industrial equip-
ment, assets, processes and events." [45]. The origins of OT can be traced as far back as the
industrial revolution in the 1800s, but truly exploded as a field in the 1960s [46]. However, in the
1990s, the fundamentals of OT began to change with the evolution of digital technology, and the
21st-century ushered in a new era of integration between IT and OT systems with industrial con-
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trol systems (ICS) integrating programmable logic controllers (PLC) and supervisory control and
data acquisition (SCADA) systems. The demands of connectivity and integration in these environ-
ments necessitated integrating IT and OT, introducing the threat actors of the IT world to the OT
environment.
2.1.1 Perimeter-Based Security in IT and OT
For many years, the gold standard for OT security assurance was perimeter-based security prac-
tices [15]. Perimeter-based security approaches attempt to establish secure boundaries around sys-
tems, assuring a safe operating environment within those prescribed boundaries. Early perimeter-
based techniques were realized by physically separating and air-gapping OT and IT networks, elim-
inating attack paths into the OT system. While perimeter-based approaches are generally seen as
necessary, they are not sufficient. Notably, several attacks such as the iconic Stuxnet attack [27]
demonstrated that even physical partitioning does not inhibit all attack paths, demonstrating the
inadequacy of such security measures and the hazards of assuming a secure operating environment.
Moreover, technological requirements for process automation have pushed toward connectivity and
the integration of networked controls, which has made it harder and harder to defend the boundaries
between OT and IT. As the complexity of OT integration increases, the sophistication and diversity
of attacks have increased in kind. To quote the Cyolo Team, "The Modern Network Perimeter is
Full of Holes" [47]. This has prompted a need for more robust security assurance practices that
delve past the boundaries into analyzing how the critical system components and processes relate
to mission objectives and how system vulnerabilities lead to mission failure [15].
2.1.2 Influence of CPS Safety Practices in CPS Security
The most apparent difference between the influences of cyber-security practices and cyber-physical
security practices is (1) the level of formalism often employed and (2) the notion of consequences.
Attack trees have early origins in the history of cyber security, first being published by Salter in
the 1990’s [48]. Attack trees have been a standard go-to for cyber-security experts and define the
security state of a system in terms of the various attacks that may be performed against it. A
thorough review of the evolution and different methodologies of attack trees can be read in [49].
At the simplest, attack trees take on the form of trees, where the topmost node is the goal of an
attacker and the branching nodes below are steps in the attack process, as seen in Figure 2.1. Attack
trees have been expanded to include many useful features, notably formal classifications for attack
steps, decision criteria, and likelihood and probability associations with attack steps.
State of the art in CPS security assurance is the product of cyber-security and safety assurance
practices. The origins of CPS safety in preventing loss and assessing risk have evolved into a
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Figure 2.1 A sample attack tree with the goal of stealing data.
practice structured by semi-formal and formal semantics, such as in safety standards such as IEC
61508 [50], ISO 26262 [51], and DO-178C [52]. For example, verification and validation in a CPS
observe strict quantifiable metrics to ensure the level of safety required of a particular device for
a particular application. On the other hand, cyber-security processes have historically observed
far less structure and uniformity in semantics, metrics, and evaluation standards. Safety assurance
practices established the foundations of formal methods for relating the system mission to component
behavior.
STPA (Systems Theoretic Process Analysis) [36], a hazard analysis model founded in STAMP
(Systems Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes) [53] is one such practice that evolved from
this space designed for safety assurance of cyber-physical systems. Many CPS security methods
evolved as transpositions of the principles of STPA to the security domain. Examples include
security analysis methods such as STPA-SEC (System-Theoretic Process Analysis for Security) [3],
STPA-SafeSec [4], HAZCADS (Hazard and Consequence Analysis for Digital Systems) [35], and
Mission Aware [15].
2.1.3 Research Gap: Attacker Modeling in Security Assurance
Formal and semi-formal security assessment methods continuously evolve as the nature of threats
and state-of-the-art technology progresses. Studies of state of the art in practice [16], [34] iden-
tify that a gap exists between state-of-the-art attacker modeling research and the threat modeling
methods being employed in practice by security review processes. We posit that functionally in-
tegrating an attacker model into an established security process is non-trivial due to the challenge
of understanding the attacker model and the security review process well enough to facilitate the
integration.
A common conclusion of attacker behavioral models is to deduce security metrics by describing
the likelihood or probability of an attacker performing one or more actions such as in [5], [54]–[59].
12
The vast majority of these works claim that the value of the attacker model will be realized as the
model and results are integrated into a security review process but never carry the research out to
the step of integration. Of all the attacker models reviewed, only LeMay’s research group in [54]
went on to build the attacker model into a functional tool [60] and demonstrate its application in
security analyses [61]. We posit that a primary reason that attacker modeling research terminates
prior to the step of integration with security review processes is because of the significant manual
effort required by the attacker modeling expert to understand an SRP well enough to integrate an
attacker model.
2.2 Attacker Modeling
In Chapter 1, we identified the following challenges that are inhibiting the adoption of attacker
models in security review processes:
• Attacker models are challenging to understand due to inconsistency in definition and structure.
• The assumptions made by attacker models are challenging to identify when not explicitly
documented.
• Misalignment of critical assumptions between attacker models and security review processes
makes integration infeasible.
• Functionally integrating attacker models into security review processes requires significant
manual effort.
The first reason for this gap is that it is difficult for an expert of a different domain to comprehend
the diverse range of attacker modeling literature. Works that seek to develop underlying foundations
for attacker modeling practices are promising but have yet to gain traction in the field [57]. Attacker
models are limited by a lack of unity in the structural description of attacker-system interactions
and in the application of attacker decision theory. Fundamentally, attacker models vary in form,
from structured ways of thinking [56] to rigorously formal system-theoretic behavioral models [62],
[63]. This diversity makes it challenging for an expert in applied security assessment to distinguish
valuable and relevant attacker modeling literature. In order to establish a fundamental basis for
discussing attacker models, it is necessary first to understand and be able to represent their core
and common attributes at a level of detail conducive to general conversation. This generalized
characterization of attacker models does not exist in the attacker modeling literature to date. Our
attacker modeling framework contributes to the state-of-the-art by implementing an attacker model
characterization workflow which serves as a standard basis for describing attacker models in the
context of integration with a security review process.
It is commonly accepted in attacker modeling that modeling complex human behavior requires
the assertion of bounding assumptions that reduce the complexity of the problem to a manageable
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size. This can readily be observed in attacker profiling techniques where different threat models
bound the profile properties of the threat actor to include differing characteristics [64]. As a rule,
attacker models seek to abstract away irrelevant detail, allowing a higher-level analysis of attacker
behavior. While it is more common to document assumptions made in security review processes [1],
[15], identification of assumptions is strongly lacking as a practice in attacker modeling. In this
dissertation’s structured literature survey, no single attacker model was identified that explicitly
identified the simplifying assumptions made about the attacker and attack procedures. Identifying
the assumptions made in attacker models is often critical when considering integrating with the
theoretic foundations of security review processes. While some assumptions may be benign, others
are critical, and it is difficult to distinguish which attributes of an attacker model may cause in-
compatibility with a security review process without performing a deep dive into the literature. In
our attacker modeling framework, we create a workflow for objectively identifying and comparing
the assumptions made by attacker models to evaluate attacker model compatibility with security
review processes.
The effort required for integrating an attacker model into a security review process is signifi-
cant [16], [34]. It can be compounded when the attacker model is designed from a perspective of
progressive theoretical research rather than for the goal of real-world application. We posit that
integrating an attacker model fundamentally requires a complete understanding of the flow of in-
formation in and out of the attacker model and the information available from and required by the
security review process. Currently, there is no generalized guiding literature for integrating attacker
models into security review processes. In order to fill this research gap, our attacker modeling
framework implements a module that creates a functional representation of the attacker model,
capturing the flow of data and describing at a high level how the input data of the attacker model
is leveraged to produce modeling results.
2.2.1 Literature Survey Overview
One of the contributions of this dissertation is a structured literature survey of attacker models.
Chapter 3 presents the literature survey workflow, which is used to guide the development of the
attacker model characterization attributes. In Chapter 4, we discuss these attributes in-depth
and identify and discuss the associated attacker modeling literature. Therefore, in expectation of
the literature survey, the remainder of this chapter is dedicated to discussing literature that more
generically sets the stage for the dive into the individual attacker models.
In reviewing the literature on attacker modeling, four categories of questions naturally arise.
The first and most apparent is, "What does this attacker model do?" Attacker models vary in
their architecture and fundamental perspectives on how the attacker is associated with the system
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through attacks. The second and third categories of questions involve what information the model
needs to execute and what information the model provides during/upon completion. The final
category involves assumptions about the attack process relevant to the context of a security review
process.
2.2.2 Describing the Attacker
In attacker modeling, a common approach is to create a correlation model where the designer
selects a series of attacker properties such as skill level, resources, intent, and motivation and
attempts to develop cumulative correlation functions that effectively predict attacker behavior when
applied to real-world attackers [65]. Adepu et al. apply a general description of an attacker as a
super-set of attacker intents and the associated CPS-Domain [57]. Monteuuis, by contrast, defines
an attacker threatening an automated vehicle as a set of properties that includes membership,
motivation, scope, methods, and goals [56]. These two attacker descriptions imply different domains
of the attacker profile. Adepu’s generalization of the nature of the attacker as the product of the
intents of the attacker and the CPS interaction implies that the attacker’s behavior will always
be intent and goal-driven and adapts to the CPS the attacker confronts. Monteuuis’s attacker
description is more context-specific and implies that only five unique attacker properties influence
the attacker’s behavior, one of those being goals. These attacker descriptions may be appropriate
in the given context. However, they capture different aspects of the attacker’s characteristics,
and their underlying frameworks are incompatible, Adepu’s being developed using system-theoretic
syntax while Monteuuis’ is developed without a semantic or formal foundation. While attacker
profiling is a common, if not casual, practice in attacker modeling, there tends to be little resolution
on the efficacy of various profiles. In order to establish a common basis, Rocchetto et al. performed
a literature search and created a six-profile model able to effectively describe attacker profiles from
the majority of cited literature [64].
2.2.3 CPS Topology Description
In a review paper of CPS security methodologies, Dibaji et al. assert that the quality of description
of a CPS network topology influences the viability of various defense mechanisms and must be a
point of consideration for cyber and cyber-physical applications [66]. Various methods have been
proposed to describe CPS topologies. Cheh et al. developed a security-focused topology capable
of maintaining information about the security state of the CPS [67]. Choley et al. apply a basic
SysML topology to aid in an attack-surface driven security review process [68].
Beling et al. [69] describes a systems engineering ontological metamodel for CPSs uniquely
tailored for safety, security, and resilience applications. This model can capture many aspects of a
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CPS, including requirement, physical, functional, interface, safety, security, and resilience elements.
The security-aware design methodology of the metamodel makes it a viable platform for integrating
the security analyst perspective and review process into the CPS design and development process.
While many CPS topology descriptions are available, few readily lend to system security per-
spectives. The methods of capturing CPS topology, architecture, and interactions have histori-
cally lacked formality. Recent efforts in model-based security have expanded state of the art by
formally describing the relationships between the models used to describe cyber-physical system
operations [70].
2.2.4 Research Gap: Attacker Model Validation
Despite the plethora of attacker models developed, the question of which is correct remains incon-
clusive primarily due to the inability to validate attacker profiles against real-world data [54]. Data
for validating attacker behavior is challenging to capture in the wild. The most common technique
is to use attack simulations where actors are given tasks and emulate the behavior of threats. These
studies are expensive to perform and difficult to execute without biased results.
This dissertation recognizes that validating a proposed attacker model may be a necessary step
toward security assurance. In light of the challenges of acquiring real-world validation data, the goal
of this dissertation in integrating AMs into SRPs may contribute to AM validation in two ways.
First, on its own, the value of an AM is critically dependent on its validity. When considered in
the context of an SRP, the driving factor is no longer attacker model validity, but rather if the AM
improves the quality of the security review, which requires the development of quality metrics and
depends on the form and function of the AM being considered and the process outlined by the SRP.
For specific attacker models, integration into an SRP may establish the value of the attacker model
where direct validation would have been unfeasible. A goal of the AMF developed in this dissertation
and the formalization it provides for AM integration into SRPs is to significantly reduce the burden
of labor required for this integration, making this form of AM value proving more accessible.
Second, a critical aspect of AMs and SRPs, highlighted and explored throughout this disserta-
tion, is that they are both critically dependent on well-formed assumptions that reduce the complex-
ity of the attacker and the system to a level that can realistically be modeled. Justifying attacker
model assumptions is complicated to prove outside of an application context. While several AMs
lay preliminary groundwork for application scenarios, the broader scope of SRPs provides a much
more thorough description of the systems, processes, and other application details that may aid in
assumption justification.
Therefore, while the challenge of validating a particular attacker model against a real-world
scenario falls outside the scope of this dissertation, the framework proposed in this dissertation is
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intended to serve as a vehicle to facilitate the design, development, and SRP integration of a wide
variety of attacker models, which would then serve as a foundation in future research of attacker-
model validation.
2.2.5 Vulnerability Database Integration
In application to a whole system, researching, compiling, and organizing all vulnerability infor-
mation related to a CPS is a monumental task. Databases such as the Common Attack Pattern
Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC) [39], the Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) [40],
the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) [41], and the Common Platform Enumeration
(CPE) [42] have been applied to attack modeling to aid in vulnerability research [59], [71]. Attacker
modeling literature has demonstrated the utility of these databases in composing vulnerability infor-
mation into tailored vulnerability data sets [5]. Furthermore, tools have been proposed that combine
these databases into hybrid search engines such as the CYBOK tool [38], which manages architec-
tural system models and can perform automated data querying on various fields of information in
component descriptions.
2.2.6 Range of Attacker Model Survey
The form and function of attacker models chosen for the literature survey range from high-level
abstractions of attacker behavior to algebraically intense probabilistic models. At the high level,
Monteuuis et al. [56] applies methodical reasoning to model the specific use case of attackers against
connected and automated vehicles, resulting in categorical predictions of behavior from four types
of attackers. Monteuuis’ model goes in-depth into the nuance of security for automated vehicles,
giving particular attention to how the relationships between various components influence the pro-
gression of various attacks. Mo et al. [72] similarly developed a system-theoretic security approach
to modeling the attack process derived in application to a power grid in order to determine the
attackers’ actions and goals. While Monteuuis’ and Mo’s models are use case-specific, more generic
high-level attacker models have been developed, as demonstrated by Vigo et al. [73] who presents
an attacker model focusing on the effect of an attacker’s physical interference on network nodes.
Basin et al. [74] presents an attacker model for formal reasoning on security protocols, observing
the effects of attacks on physical properties of the CPS. Basin applies formal methods to model
how the spatial orientation of nodes in a communication system influences the attacker’s ability
to succeed. In a similar application, McEvoy et al. [62] proposes an alternative to the commonly
applied Dolev-Yao model in order to model communications systems. While still being founded at
a high level in formal reasoning, these attacker models establish a more robust foundation through
symbolic methods of system property derivation.
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Where formal reasoning provides high-level insights, more rigorous attacker models seek to pro-
vide specific and conclusive analysis. Teixeira et al. [63] symbolically models attackers performing
various attack methods against a CPS based on an attack space composed of system knowledge,
disruption resources, and disclosure resources. Orojlloo et al. [55] applies a Markovian analysis
method to model the dynamic behavior of countermeasure-equipped systems under attack for par-
ticular attackers.
Ekelhart et al. [59] applies an attack simulation engine to abstracted attack vectors to evaluate
the number and prominence of various attack paths through a CPS. While Ekelhart’s model does
not go in-depth into the behavior of the CPS, it provides a computationally robust framework that
can provide quantitative analysis on the various attack vectors through the CPS. Extending on this
concept, Le May et al. [75] presents the ADVISE method, which is an attacker model that describes
the relationship between the attacker and the system as an abstract attack execution graph, defined
as the set of attack steps, access, knowledge, skill, and goals. The ADVISE method is integrated
into modeling tools to reduce the effort in evaluating various CPSs.
Even more rigorous probabilistic functions are applied by Adepu et al. [57] who describes a
generalized approach for modeling attackers and attacks in a CPS, demonstrating the model against
a water treatment plant. Where Adepu limits the attacker’s influencing factors to intents, Deloglos
et al. [5] developed a generic attacker model that allows for a wide variety of attacker profiles
to be applied. This model applies probabilistic correlation functions to model the behavior of a
non-deterministic attacker against a CPS.
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Chapter Three
Attacker Modeling Framework Overview
This chapter gives an overview of our attacker modeling framework, starting with the workflow
we used to develop it. We describe the composition of the attacker modeling framework and give
a brief overview of its components. We also discuss the application of the AMF and summarize
how the components are leveraged to integrate attacker models into security review processes. The
purpose of this chapter is to briefly and concisely facilitate the big picture perspective of our attacker
modeling framework. In Chapters 4, 5, and 6 we dive into the AMF components in-depth.
3.1 What are Attacker Models
The literature review in Chapter 2 paints a broad picture of what attacker models are and several
ways they can be used. Due to this breadth and diversity, we begin by specifying our definition
of an attacker model for this research. The field of cyber-security as a whole is no stranger to
threat modeling. Threat models are commonly seen as algorithms or processes that model or
simulate characteristics of a specific attacker or attack against a system. In security fields, the
terms threat model and attacker model are sometimes used interchangeably [64]. However, with
regard to attacker behavior, there are critical distinctions between the two. For this research, we
define attacker models how they are most commonly defined in the field of attacker modeling: as
attacker behavioral models. The critical distinction between a threat model and an attacker model
is that where a threat model explicitly defines the nature of a threat, an attacker model qualitatively
or quantitatively defines the threat’s behavior as a function of the nature of the threat. By this
definition, it could be said that attacker models are the subset of threat models that explore how
the attacker’s nature influences the attacker’s behavior.
The critical implication behind this definition is that for an attacker model, if the nature of
the attacker changes, then the modeled behavior of the attacker may change as a result. While it
is common to see attackers discussed in SRPs, it is a rare exception to see a relationship defined
between the nature and the behavior of the attacker.
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affects SRP Compatibility
6. Evaluate the attribute
utiliy in SRPs
7. Refactor AMC Attributes
Figure 3.1 The workflow used to create the attacker model characterization module.
3.2 Development Workflow
The creation of our attacker modeling framework required the intermediate formulation of several
key concepts such as, "How do you describe the relevance of an AM to an SRP?", "How do you
distinguish between an AM’s inherent value and its value to an SRP?", "What is the relationship
between the attributes of an attacker model and the assumptions it makes?", and, "What is the level
of abstraction necessary for generalization of the AMF?" Throughout this dissertation, we identify
and explain our conclusions for these concepts and several others and identify their contribution to
the attacker modeling framework on the whole.
Finding solutions to these questions and synthesizing our generalized attacker modeling frame-
work was done through a data driven literature survey and analysis. This development workflow
can be seen in Figure 3.1 and consists of two primary efforts. The first is the collection of attacker
model attributes. This started with a broad literature review of existing attacker models where
we explored attacker models from their historical origins to state-of-the-art. For each attacker
model, we characterized the form and function using attribute tagging and plain-text descriptions
to identify each attacker model’s underlying structure and operative mechanisms. To say attacker
models are diverse in form and function is an understatement. This literature survey was a prime
example of achieving order through the chaos as we worked through dozens of attacker models with
hundreds of characteristics and eventually used the broad set to formulate our attacker modeling
framework. As we developed this list of attributes, we formulated a pseudo-ontology of attacker
models. There were several challenges with this process, not the least of which is that the field
of attacker modeling is young enough that there is rarely consensus on how to represent common
terms, ideas, and techniques. A good example of this can be seen in [64] where Rocchetto performs
a literature review of attacker profiling techniques in several attacker models and provides a table
of terminology mapping for the various terms used across different publications.
The second effort of the AMF creation was the refinement of the various attributes using the
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security review process perspective. The final set of attributes we use to describe attacker models
is captured in this dissertation as what we call the Attacker Model Characterization (AMC), and
is presented in depth in Chapter 4. The number and scope of attribute results can explode to
an unusable size if left unbounded and may reduce the practical utility of the AMF. Therefore,
rather than capturing attributes to describe all characteristics of attacker models, we are specifi-
cally concerned with those characteristics that make attacker models uniquely useful or unuseful to
integration with security review processes. Our workflow was centered mainly around identifying
and justifying which attributes those are.
To boil down our generalized pseudo-ontology of attacker model attributes in step 3 to a final
set of AMC attributes we developed an attribute analysis process captured in Figure 3.1 as steps 4,
5, 6, and 7. In step 4, we compile the set of attributes into an intermediate AMC. These steps were
primarily concerned with identifying categories of attributes and relationships between attributes.
Our AMC employs a concept of attribute dependency, and we often had to refine our notions of
what attributes are genuinely dependent on others as we identified research that employed the
dependent without the dependency. In step 5, we evaluate how attributes affect compatibility with
security review processes. This involved an evaluation of several different SRPs, including EPRI’s
TAM [1], STPA-SEC [3], STPA-SafeSec [4], EPRI’s HAZCADS [35], and MissionAware [15] in order
to determine if and how different attacker model characteristics could inhibit integration.
In step 6, we evaluated the value that different attacker model characteristics contributed to
security review processes. This inherently required the development of the concept of value for
attacker models. We discuss this notion in depth in Section 6.1. An important finding of our
research is that an objective valuation of an attacker model is difficult to defend outside of the
context of an application. Part of the novelty of our integration framework is the creation of a
scoring-aided AM evaluation workflow capable of providing objective valuations of attacker models
relative to the characteristics of a security review process. In application, this means that evaluating
a set of attacker models for integration with two different security review processes will result in two
different valuations, one for each SRP. In step 7 we apply the results from steps 5 and 6 to refactor
the set of AMC attributes. This step included the removal of attributes that proved inconsequential
to SRP integration, the consolidation of similar attributes, and the division of complex attributes
that are better characterized as multiple attributes.
Steps 4, 5, 6, and 7 were repeated as a refinement feedback loop until the AMC reached a steady
state of attribute consistency where sequential cycles resulted in the same set of attributes. It
should be noted that between the time of the AMC creation and the publication of this dissertation,
additional attacker modeling literature was published or discovered and integrated into the basis of
the AMC. When discovered, new attacker models would be introduced into the refinement process
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by performing steps 1, 2, and 3 for the specific attacker model, then integrating the results into
the existing AMC in step 4 and repeating the refinement cycle until the AMC again reached a
steady state. While this process was performed manually, the development of support tools and
the application of natural language processing could serve as an aid to maintaining and scaling the
development workflow.
3.3 A High-Level Perspective
The AMF developed in this dissertation is an over-arching framework for describing attacker models
and their functional implementations in a way that uniquely facilitates the integration of those
attacker models into security review processes. The potential applications of the AMF are extensive.
Previous literature on attacker modeling frameworks has identified many attacker behaviors that
may be modeled and a multitude of methods to model them. The lack of formalism surrounding the
form and function of attacker models can make it difficult to readily understand how the attacker
models work and what assumptions they make. The proposed attacker modeling framework defines
a security process for describing the diverse range of behaviors captured by attacker models. Our
generalized attacker model characterization allows AM developers to better describe how their AMs
work and the core principles by which they operate. It also provides greater insight into the utility
of the AM by identifying its operative requirements and the valuable insights and results it provides.
Also, contextual assumptions are perhaps the most critical aspect of cyber- and cyber-physical
security and are discussed in-depth in Chapter 4. The widespread disagreement surrounding the
efficacy of various cyber- and cyber-physical security research practices can largely be attributed to
contextual assumptions made by those researchers but not identified or defended adequately. The
attacker model characterization process in the proposed AMF identifies critical assumptions made
in attacker modeling research and defines a process for documenting those assumptions.
Finally, a common fault in attacker modeling literature is the inadequate clarification of what
the attacker model is doing without first requiring an understanding of how it is doing it. Goals,
objectives, and methods are often described in parallel with the functional description of the at-
tacker model. This reduces the usability of the attacker model by requiring a higher effort for
comprehension and an even higher effort for interpreting assumptions made by the attacker model.
In order to reduce this effort, we divide the AMF into two primary components, the Attacker Model











Figure 3.2 The two primary components of our attacker modeling framework.
3.3.1 Attacker Model Characterization (AMC) Overview
The purpose of the AMC is to describe the distinguishing characteristics of an attacker model. A
well-formed description of an attacker model that captures distinguishing characteristics is challeng-
ing to create objectively without defining a context of application. The scope of this dissertation
in integrating attacker models into security review processes is the context we used to develop our
AMC. While our AMC may have application outside of this context, we expect it would need to be
expanded to provide an adequate description for applying AMs in different research fields.
One of the most critical functions of the AMC is that it aids in identifying assumptions for
both AMs and SRPs. When developing an AM or an SRP it becomes evident that modeling the
attacker in complete detail is as impossible as comprehensively assessing the security state of a
CPS. Neither can be developed without making assumptions about the attacker and the system.
A well-formed attacker model does not need to be a comprehensive attacker model but rather is
one that makes well-reasoned assumptions and documents them explicitly. Likewise, a well-formed
SRP is one that intelligently develops and documents simplifying assumptions that make the cost
and effort to perform a review realistic. Far too often in both research fields, these assumptions are
not explicitly stated and can be challenging to identify without both a broad understanding of the
research field and an exhaustive understanding of the particular AM or SRP. When considering the
objective of integrating an AM into an SRP, assumption mismatch can cause a well-formed AM and
a well-formed SRP to be incompatible, and thus the AMC must be able to identify and distinguish
these assumptions.
Another critical function of the AMC is to identify the goals and objectives of attacker models.
The broad diversity of attacker models comes with a broad diversity of goals and objectives, and
the value an AM provides to an SRP depends on the original goals and objectives of the AM. The
AMC identifies the generic categories and objectives of attacker models and aids in identifying the
value an AM may provide to different SRPs.
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3.3.2 Attacker Model Functional Representation (AMFR) Overview
The attacker model functional representation seeks to capture at a high level how the attacker
model functionally works. The different implementations of attacker models vary in complexity,
ranging from structured methods of thinking to formal implementations of discrete-time functions
and system-theoretic models. The goal of the AMFR is to be a standardized functional representa-
tion methodology that captures how an AM is functionally realized in enough detail to understand
how the flow of information is leveraged to model attacker behavior. This includes breaking down
the attacker model into functional subsystems with rules-based descriptions, all related by data flow.
The partitioning of functionality and the definition of well-formed boundaries between partitions
aids in reducing the effort to comprehend the attacker model.
In addition, the AMFR contributes to the attacker model integration process by characterizing
the functional boundaries of the attacker model, which reduces the effort to identify the hand-off
between the attacker model and the security review process.
3.4 Applying the Attacker Modeling Framework
While our AMF has broad application in attacker model development and research, its true novelty
is realized when applied to integrate attacker models into security review processes. In Chapter 6,
we develop the attacker model integration workflow, which is a semi-formal method for evaluating
attacker models and integrating them into security review processes. The workflow divides the
process accordingly. First the AMC is leveraged to evaluate attacker models. In Chapter 4, we
also introduce the Security Review Process Characterization (SRPC), which is similar in form
to the attacker model characterization, except that it is developed from the perspective of the
security review process. Our workflow guides the security expert to evaluate the various attacker
models using a combination of scoring methods and attribute analysis. This workflow guides the
evaluation of attacker model compatibility, attacker model incompatibility remediation, attacker
model valuation, and attacker model selection.
Next, the workflow leverages the AMFR to identify the bounds and data hand-off between the
selected attacker model and the security review process. This includes the characterization of all
input and output data from the attacker model and all provided and expected data from the security
review process. It then uses this characterization to map the integration of the attacker model to the
security review process. The attacker model integration workflow significantly reduces the burden
of evaluating how well an AM fulfills the needs and functional requirements of an SRP.
The AMC and AMFR are described in full detail in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively, and the




In Chapter 3 we gave an overview of our Attacker Modeling Framework and identified that it is
composed of two primary modules, which we call the Attacker Model Characterization (AMC), and
the Attacker Model Functional Representation (AMFR). In this Chapter, we discuss the first of
those two modules.
4.1 Overview of the Attacker Model Characterization Module
The purpose of the AMC is to describe an attacker model, capturing characterizing information
including that information which is relevant to a red-team or blue-team security expert considering
the attacker model for integration with a security review process.
4.1.1 Interface Characterization
In order to capture this information, the AMC identifies characteristics about the attacker model
which we call attributes, which are categorized into three groups of information types we call inter-
faces. The proposed AMC can be observed in Figure 4.1. The AMC breaks down the characteriza-
tion of the attacker model into three categorical interfaces which capture 1) the input information
required by the attacker model, 2) the output information provided by the attacker model, and 3)
contextual information about the attacker model. The design of the AMC was influenced by both
the diverse nature of existing attacker models and by the expectations and requirements of security
review processes that may integrate them such as STPA-SEC [3], HAZCAD [35], and Bakirtzis’
ontological metamodel [76].
4.1.2 Attributes
An attribute defines a characteristic of an attacker model that specifies behavior, form, or structure.
At its core, the AMC is a finite collection of attributes that together capture and describe all the
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Figure 4.1 The high-level definition of the attacker model characterization module, in-
cluding its three interfaces.
characteristics of an attacker model which are relevant to integration with a security review process.
It captures these attributes in enough detail to evaluate the AM’s compatibility with an SRP and
to identify the assumptions it makes that are relevant to integration with an SRP. We consider the
AMC to be defined as the set A of k attributes such that A = {a1, a2, ..., ak}. Each categorical
interface is defined as a hierarchical subset of these attributes which are often grouped into larger
sets of attribute categories. Given the input interface, the contextual interface, and the output
interface, each having l, m, and n attributes respectively where k = l+m+ n, the set of attributes
in each interface is defined as PI = {a1, ..., al}, PC = {a1, ..., am}, and PO = {a1, ..., an} where
the attributes in each set are exclusive such that A = PI ∪ PC ∪ PO.
Each attribute is captured as a tuple of a descriptive statement D and an indicator I such
that a = {D, I}. Indicators can be either in the form of a boolean or as a selection of a finite
set of options. The indicator asserts whether or not the attacker model implements the particular
attribute. For the boolean indicator, this is achieved by a value of true indicating that the AM does
implement that attribute, whereas a value of false indicates that it does not. The selection indicator
not only indicates if an AM implements an attribute, but also categorizes how it implements that
attribute using a finite set of options. The descriptive statement is a short summary of how the
attacker model implements that attribute.
Attributes may be associated via a parent/child relationship where the existence of the child
attribute in an AM necessitates the existence of the parent attribute. This is useful for attributes
that can be realized in one or more ways but when certain realization methods critically affect SRP
compatibility or carry strong assumptions.
A significant contribution of this AMC is the determination of which attributes should be in-
cluded in the interfaces, which should not, and for the attributes with selection options, which
options should be available. Attributes were identified through an extensive review of existing at-
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tacker modeling and security review process literature, which is defined in Section 3.2. Not only
did this process aid in identifying which attributes to include in the AMC, but it also aided in
understating the affect that including different attributes has on the AM, including but not limited
to the following:
• How the presence or absence of the attribute changes the compatibility of the AM with a
security assessment process.
• How the attribute distinguishes between attacker models.
• If the attribute creates or implies assumptions that are commonly relevant to security review
processes.
The documentation of these attributes in creating an AMC for a specific attacker model allows a
high-level abstraction of the composition of the attacker model. This leads to a framework that
readily facilitates the evaluation of many attacker models with a fraction of the effort that would
be required from an unguided attacker model evaluation.
Example Attribute
Consider evaluating the attribute Time (further discussed in Section 4.2.3) for different at-
tacker models. The attacker model defined by Teixeira et al. [63] models the CPS as a
discrete-time system. For this AM, the attribute Time may be described as {True, Describes
the CPS as a discrete-time system}. Contrast this to the AM defined by Adepu et al. [57],
which considers as one of the criteria for success for an attack whether or not the attacker
succeeds within a certain amount of time. This may be described as {True, Criteria for attack
includes successful realization of all attack intents within a certain period of time}. While both
AMs include concepts of Time, the short description provides context how the Time attribute
is realized. Alternatively, Time could be defined for the AMs using the same descriptions
but with a selection indicator instead of the boolean indicator as the set {Discrete, Continu-
ous}. For the Time attribute in the given examples, both AMs would be defined with the same
description, but Teixeira’s AM would have the Discrete selection while Adepu’s would have
the Continuous selection. The attribute format allows the description of attributes that are
realized very differently between attacker models.
4.2 Contextual Interface
The purpose of the contextual interface is to summarize and make accessible information describing
how the attacker model works and what assumptions it makes about the nature of the attacker,
the nature of the CPS, and the nature of how the attacker relates to the CPS. The attributes of
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Figure 4.2 The contextual interface of the attacker model characterization with its hier-
archically organized set of attributes.
attacker model, the objective, and the dimensions of analysis of the attacker model.
4.2.1 Principle Perspective of the Attacker Model
The question of how this attacker model relates the attacker to attacks and to the CPS is deceptively
difficult to answer without performing an in-depth dive into each attacker model. The progression
and value of attacker modeling research is in large part realized as researchers find new, unique, and
verifiable ways to evaluate this relationship between the attacker and the system. The proposed
AMC identifies three principle perspectives that at a high level capture the nature of the relationship
between the attacker, attacks, and the CPS. These are the system component perspective, the
vulnerability perspective, and the individual attack perspective. These perspectives are not intended
as a formal or rigorous formulation such as in [70], but rather to identify the fundamental orientation
of the how the attacker is related to the CPS.
The system component perspective first defines the system as an association of components, then
associates vulnerabilities to those components, finally associating the attacker to the vulnerabilities.
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Figure 4.3 Associative representations of the three contextual principle perspectives an
attacker model can take on the relationship between the attacker, system components, and
vulnerabilities. Image taken from our earlier publication on attacker modeling frameworks
in [6].
This perspective orients the attacker model around the system design. It also tends to orient around
interactions between components and better capture how attackers navigate through systems. A
graphical representation of how the system, the attacker, and vulnerabilities relate for the system
perspective can be seen in Figure 4.3a.
The vulnerability perspective begins by identifying vulnerabilities associated with components.
It then develops an association of vulnerabilities, then associates the vulnerabilities to the attacker.
The vulnerability perspective tends to orient the attacker model around attacks and attack proce-
dures. A graphical representation of how the attacker, vulnerabilities, and the system components
relate for the vulnerability perspective can be seen in Figure 4.3b.
The individual attack perspective is normally observed in research when an attacker model is
designed to model a specific situation, and is normally derived in the context of a particular attack,
attacker, and/or CPS. As such, application of the individual attack perspective in an SRP usually
requires either 1) the SRP conforms to the attacker model’s specific assumptions of the attack,
attacker, and the CPS or 2) the SRP experts perform some amount of work to adapt the attacker
model to the SRP context. While attacker models that use the individual attack perspective may
require the greatest amount of effort to integrate, the constraints of a very specific context tend
to allow them to produce more robust and insightful results. A graphical representation of how
the attacker, vulnerabilities, and the system relate for the vulnerability perspective can be seen in
Figure 4.3c.
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While attacker models tend to stick to a single principle perspective, it is possible for an attacker
model to feature additional perspectives as a step in the modeling process. For example, Deloglos et
al. [5] develops an attacker model which utilizes the system perspective initially, but then develops
individual attack perspectives in the form of an attack-decision tree to better describe how certain
vulnerabilities influence the paths an attacker can take through a system. Orojloo et al. [55] devel-
ops a model based on the component perspective which quantitatively evaluates the relationships
between components to associate vulnerability dependency chains, developing a vulnerability per-
spective. While there is research available from all three principle perspectives, it is arguable that
the CPS security community is moving toward the system perspective.
While the principle perspective employed by an attacker model does not in and of itself enable
or inhibit the functionality within the attacker model, it is noted that certain perspectives may be
preferred for particular applications. Attacker models employing systems-theoretic methods tend
to use the system component perspective because systems-theoretical methods have a fundamental
dependency on the operative nature of the system and the relationships between system components.
Attacker models that attempt to partition the analysis of the system architecture from the analysis of
system vulnerabilities often employ the vulnerability perspective. This can be seen in the application
of attack trees where the fundamental analysis is of vulnerability relationships [49].
4.2.2 Objective
Attacker models tend to be goal-oriented where the correlation of an attacker to a system is used to
deduce an unknown about the security state of the CPS. Due to the diversity of attacker models,
the AMF does not define a finite list of objectives. The objective is unique from all other attributes
in that it does not contain a boolean or selection indicator and is simply composed of a short
description. The goal of the objective attribute is to capture a high-level description of the purpose
the attacker model was developed for by the original author.
4.2.3 Dimensions of Analysis
Capturing how an attacker interacts with a CPS is a considerable challenge in attacker modeling.
We adopt the common term in the field of attacker modeling of a dimension of analysis to categorize
an attribute that describes an aspect of the conceptual universe the attacker and the system reside
in. These dimensions can be seen in Figure 4.2.
The goal of the dimensions of analysis attributes is to call out and identify assumptions made
by the AM, SRP, or both that are critical for consideration for integration, but may be difficult to
recognize if not explicitly identified. The dimensions of analysis aid in understanding why certain
AMs may be more suited to contexts and contextual assumptions than others. Teixeira et al. [63]
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describes cyber-physical attacks as residing in a three-dimensional space consisting of system knowl-
edge, disruption resources, and disclosure resources. According to Teixeira, various attacker models
are more readily suited to address different quadrants of this space based on the dimensions they do
or do not include in their attacker modeling process. While the dimensions of the attacker models
reviewed in the development of this work are summarized in Figure 4.2, additional dimensions may
be necessary to describe attacker models as the landscape for attacker modeling research continues
to evolve.
Unpredictability
Unpredictability is the notion of including behavior in an attacker model that intentionally makes the
attacker behavior unexpected or hard to predict. Unpredictability requires that a system provided
with the same input cannot have an absolutely predictable output. This is employed in attacker
models when modeling uncertainty in various processes.
Deloglos et al. [5] demonstrates how a lack of knowledge of the attacker may be modeled by
introducing an unpredictable attacker. The attacker in Deloglos’ model is defined as a property-
based attacker with a range of values for each property. Each property range is randomly sampled
at the beginning of the attack process, resulting in an unknown attacker.
Unpredictability is often used in attacker models as an alternative to exhaustive modeling where
the state-space required to model all possible attack procedures and outcomes explodes to an un-
manageable solution. In such instances, unpredictability can be used with repeated execution to
evaluate the attack variance that occurs from the changing characteristics of the attacker model.
Time
An attacker model that includes the time attribute attempts to capture the concept of physical
time as a part of the modeling methodology. Time-dependency is observed in several of the attacker
models and can serve several different functions. One example is when the CPS, the attacker,
and/or their process of interaction are modeled in discrete or continuous time, as was done in
[55], [57], [63], [72], [74]. Models that utilize time can leverage it to determine metrics such as
success/failure criteria for attack outcomes as in [57], or to calculate physical processes such as
real-world communication delays as in [74]. Attacker models that do not utilize time-dependent
attacker or system models can still apply time principles in different ways. LeMay in [54] assigns
time values to various attacker actions, estimating the time for a complete attack as the sum of
times for all attacker actions.
In the field of attacker modeling, making the assumption of time-invariance allows for drastic
simplification of attacker models. As is the case for most attributes, the inclusion or exclusion of
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time in an AM does not in itself imply a higher or lower quality attacker model. However, certain
features and functions in attacker models can be considered more or less effective based on the
inclusion of time. For example, modeling intruder detection or countermeasures in AMs without
the inclusion of time makes the assumption that detection or countermeasure deployment process
is time-agnostic. Research has demonstrated contrarily that the effectiveness of intrusion detection
and countermeasure deployment systems is critically dependent on how much time it takes to detect
and counter the attacker [54], [72]. Therefore, it is reasonable to assess that an AM that claims
intrusion detection or countermeasures modeling capabilities without a concept of time and without
justifying the assumption of time-agnosticism is of concern.
When considering the effect of time-dependency in an AM for application in an SRP, it is
important to recognize that, while the application of time is bounded inside the AM, how time is
leveraged may influence what information must be provided to the AM. For example, AMs that
leverage intrusion detection or countermeasures often depend on attacker actions being provided
with associated time for completion. Similarly, AMs that output security metric violations often
require as input time-dependent CPS process properties.
Executable
While an attacker model, by definition, must be able to at some level model the behavior of an
attacker and the interactions between the attacker and the system, it does not necessarily provide
an algorithm for simulating the execution of an attack. An attacker model is executable if it lever-
ages the modeled behavior of the attacker to simulate an attack process, producing attack results.
Deloglos’ AM in [5] is executable as an algorithm with a feedback loop that sequentially executes
attack steps against the CPS. The series of sequential attack steps constitutes an entire attack.
Orojloo in [55] implements an executable attacker model as a set of continuous-time equations that
model the change of the system state as the attack progresses. Ekelhart in [59] applies an executable
attack simulation engine to abstracted attack vectors to evaluate the number and prominence of
various attack paths through a CPS.
While the quality of an attacker model may be significant, its utility in application depends on
whether or not it is executable. When considering integration into an SRP or any application that
requires execution of the attacker model, the ability to execute the simulation of an attack process
is a requirement.
Operational Method
The operational method is a child attribute of the executable attribute and indicates if the attacker
model is fundamentally executed as a discrete time system, a continuous time system, or as a series
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of sequential steps. Deloglos in [5] uses a sequential operation where the attack is modeled as a
sequential execution of a feedback loop of attacker-system interactions. Le May in [54] models the
attack execution as a series of sequential steps composing a modified attack tree. Adepu’s model
in [57] captures the state of the CPS as a function of continuous time. Similarly, Basin’s AM in [74],
which is particularly concerned with modeling physical aspects of wireless communication systems,
models the communication process as a function of continuous time.
4.2.4 Attacker/CPS Interaction Attribute Category
The dimensions of analysis category is further divided into several sub-categories for clarity. The
first of these is the Attacker/CPS Interaction category. Attributes in this category define how the
attacker model relates the attacker to the CPS.
CPS Security Controls
CPS Security Controls are CPS-implemented controls used for detecting attacks and/or intervening
in the case of an ongoing attack with the intent of inhibiting attack progression or mitigating attack
consequences. These are most commonly realized via Intrusion Detection and Countermeasures
which are both child attributes of the CPS Security Controls attribute.
Countermeasures
Ekelhart’s et al. attacker model [59] includes system controls as preconditions to attacker actions,
modeling the effects of preventative and detective controls such as an antivirus on a computer. In
using this, Ekelehart’s AM predicts the difference in attack outcomes against a system without con-
trols versus against a system with controls. Le May’s attacker model [54] similarly includes system
countermeasures as a variable in the probabilistic functions that predict attack success. Where both
of these AMs model controls at a low-level, an example of high-level control modeling is in Moteu-
uis’ AM [56] where he reasons about the effects of countermeasures on various attack scenarios and
how the existence of countermeasures influences attacker behavior. The design and use of counter-
measures requires some amount of preliminary knowledge of expected attacks. When considering
a formal method or algorithm for modeling countermeasures in an attacker model, the relationship
between the countermeasure and the attack must be explicitly defined in order to formulate a mech-
anism by which the countermeasure can inhibit the attack process. In AMs with a component or
vulnerability perspective, this relationship can be defined either by the model or assumed as input
to the model via attack vector associations to countermeasure actions or via attacker vector asso-
ciations to security properties. In AMs that use the individual attack perspective, the relationship
between countermeasures is most commonly defined as a part of the AM. Also, the ability to deploy
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countermeasures implies the ability to detect attacks. The applications of countermeasures without
employing attack detection identifies an assumption of an alternative source of information that is
able to indicate the occurrence of an attack to trigger countermeasure deployment.
Intrusion Detection
Intrusion detection is the process of monitoring system behavior in order to identify behaviors
indicative of the presence of an unauthorized intruder. It is often associated with CPS control
actions, being included as a prerequisite to the deployment of countermeasures as a part of attack
detection. Ekelhart et al. [59] includes intrusion detection as a control method, modeling its effects
on the attack outcome. Le May et al. [54] includes the probability of intrusion detection as a
variable in the function used to calculate the attractiveness of different attack steps. McEvoy et
al. [62] created an attacker model base on a pi-calculus variant with the primary purpose of intrusion
detection. This model used pi-calculus to formally define both the system infrastructure and the
adversary capabilities, then developed a formulation to detect anomalous control readings resulting
from attacker interaction with the system.
While both similar, intrusion detection differs from attack detection in its fundamental objec-
tive. The primary goal of attack detection is to monitor for and identify attack actions performed
by the attacker against a system. Intrusion detection, on the other hand, seeks to identify the
presence of an attacker in a system, either as a result of or even apart from hostile action. Like
countermeasures, intrusion detection requires an explicit formulation characterizing the relation-
ship between the attacker (or the attacks) and the system. This formulation is either defined as an
inherent characteristic of the attacker model or is required as input to the attacker model.
Attack Procedures
Attack procedures are core to attacker models and are realized using either a qualification scheme
or a process scheme. The attacker procedure is the component of an attacker model that relates the
attacker, the attack, and the CPS, modeling the execution of the attack. In a qualification scheme,
attacks are treated as succeed/fail depending on whether some property-based criteria have been
met by the attacker and/or the CPS state. In a process scheme, attacks succeed or fail based on
the resultant value of an algebraic or system-theoretic process.
In the attacker model developed by Deloglos in [5], attacker actions are selected based on prob-
abilistic equations, but the execution of the attack is performed through a simple qualification
scheme where if the attacker has the ability to perform the attack it succeeds and if the attacker
does not have the ability it fails. Similarly, Ekelhart in [59] uses a qualification scheme that assigns
preconditions to attacker actions and if an action meets all preconditions for a particular target, it
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succeeds. Adepu in [57] uses a process-based attack procedure where the AM models the interac-
tion of the attacker with the system and success of an attack is marked by the system entering an
invalid state. System-theoretic approaches are common such as those in [55], [62], [63], [72], as well
as Basin’s in [74] which models the interaction of honest and dishonest agents in the system as a
continuous-time interaction process and leverages security protocols to identify violations of allowed
system behavior. LeMay in [54] employs a Markovian decision process to calculate the likelihood of
all attack actions being selected, then selects the action with the highest likelihood.
The mechanism for attack procedure has a profound impact on the efficacy of an attacker model.
The attack procedure is the component of the AM that models the decision process of the attacker
and how different characteristics of the target system, the attacks, and the attacker interact to
result in attacker behavior. One of the greatest variables in cyber-security is the human factor.
We as humans are very complex creatures and modeling or predicting the behavior of attackers
is a monumental challenge. The fact that many security review processes don’t utilize security
attacker behavioral modeling, however, does not mean that it’s not happening somewhere in the
process. Often it just means that assumptions or subjective reasoning is being applied that the
security experts may or may not be aware of, effectively implementing a qualification-based attack
procedure reasoned out by the security expert.
As described in Section 3.3, in order to be viable, attacker models must make simplifying as-
sumptions that reduce the complexity of the attack procedure enough to arrive at a reasonable
solution. While the burden of effort to implement an attacker model is a product of many different
characteristics, it generally holds true that the higher the complexity of an attacker model, the
more effort it takes to comprehend and implement the attacker model. While this burden of effort
is captured in part by the description of the attack procedure attribute, it is also represented in the
input interface of the AMC which captures the information required by the AM to execute, which
is often a direct result of the complexity of the attack procedure of the AM.
Attack Consequences
Attack consequences capture how the effects of the attack inhibit the system from realization of
its operational function and goals. Attack consequence descriptions vary depending on the CPS
modeled and the AM, but typically associate the success or failure of attacks to CPS services,
processes, and security properties. Adepu et al. in [57] associates attack result to system process
properties and performance metrics to identify how the system performance is affected by various
attack actions. Orojloo et al. in [55] demonstrates how system process properties can be used to
calculate the risk associated with various attack actions.
Evaluation of attack consequences require an understanding of not only proper system behavior
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and process, but improper system behavior and process. While proper system behavior can be
proven or disproven using security protocols, understanding improper system behavior requires a
more thorough understanding of the system architecture and can lead into complex analyses of
unexpected system behaviors and unexpected system states. This problem is commonly addressed
in security review processes by separating the attack analysis process and the consequence analysis
process into separate well-formed steps of the security reviews. This can be observed in EPRI’s
toolbox of security tools where attack consequence analysis is performed in the HAZCAD tool and
the results are fed into the attack analysis performed in the TAM tool toward the end of the TAM
workflow.
4.2.5 CPS Behavior Attribute Category
The second sub-category of the dimensions attribute category is CPS Behavior attribute category.
Attributes in this category capture how the CPS operates. This includes structural aspects such as
the cyber and physical orientation of the CPS to process-related aspects such as safety and security
protocols.
CPS Security Protocols
CPS security protocols are properties and procedures that define acceptable CPS behavior with
regard to security requirements. CPS security protocols are often used in AMs for identifying how
attacker interaction violates the system by identifying when and where system behavior deviates
from the proper protocols. Application of CPS security protocols is often analogous to how property
proving is applied in CPS assessment for safety assurance.
These security protocols are often received as input to the attacker model as a part of the
CPS description and violation of these protocols is described in conclusion to the simulation of the
attacker model. Basin et al. in [74] develops security protocols for four system behaviors which
are authenticated ranging, ultrasound distance bounding, delayed key disclosure, and secure time
synchronization. Basin extends research on security protocols to include physical aspects of security
protocols and leverages attacker models for security protocol verification. Vigo in [73] developed a
higher-level attacker model which explored several ways that security protocol violation can affect a
CPS based on different types of attackers. Vigo particularly focused on bridging security protocols
between the cyber and the physical worlds and how physical interactions change procedures for
automated security protocol verification. Security protocols are most commonly applied in one of
two ways. The first is for attack detection where security properties are leveraged as bounds for
proper system operation and violation of those bounds implies an attack. The second is for proving
system security and stability in spite of attacks, in which case security protocols are employed by
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the system and the absence of process deviation from those protocols during attacks us used to
prove security protocols. For both cases, the application of security protocols in attacker models
assumes the availability of detailed knowledge of the system design, the system processes, and the
system controls, as well as detailed knowledge of how the attacker can relate to the system.
In considering integrating AMs that employ security protocols into SRPs, it is of note that the
detailed knowledge of the system design, system processes, and system controls is often expected
as input to the attacker model from the SRP, and not formulated by the AM itself. The burden of
producing security protocols for a complex CPS is significant and in an SRP that does not already
provide the protocols, this burden may inhibit the usage of such an AM.
CPS Communication
The CPS Communication attribute identifies if an attacker model defines communication inter-
actions between components of the CPS. In [74], Basin models physical communication between
wireless components, specifically evaluating the effects of distance-based communication delays on
intruder detection by monitoring violations of time-based security protocols. In [5], Deloglos iden-
tifies all communication channels between system components and the types of communication
employed, which are leveraged to evaluate attack propagation using the communications. McEvoy’s
AM in [62] is specially designed for SCADA systems to use pi-calculus to represent communications
between components in the SCADA network.
While the vast majority of attacker models employ some form of communication modeling, the
form and function of it varies drastically. The Component Relationships attribute of the input
interface complements this attribute by identifying what input information is required by the AM
from the SRP in order to model the communication-based interactions between the CPS components.
CPS Process State
The CPS Process State attribute is common to nearly all attacker models with an operational
method and identifies how the AM captures the process state of the CPS as the attack progresses.
AMs that have a discrete-time operational method tend toward representing the process state as a
snapshot of all process values at any given point in discrete time, as is observed in [55], [63]. Similarly,
AMs that employ sequential operational methods tend to capture the process state for each step
of the sequence as the set of all internal variables in the AM. AMs that employ a continuous-time
operational methods can capture the state of the system at periodic or a-periodic intervals such as
in [57], [74] or can leverage system-theoretic models that can formulaically resolve the state of the
system at any given point in time.
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CPS Security State
The CPS Security State attribute identifies how the AM captures the security state of the CPS
as the attack progresses. AMs such as [5], [54], [59] maintain a record of system components that
have been compromised as the attack progresses, which can be combined with a record of the CPS
Process State to evaluate the progression of the attack. AMs such as [62], [72], [74] record the CPS
Process State throughout the attack and apply security protocols to evaluate when, where, and how
the system behavior deviated from the expected behavior.
Cyber Processes
The Cyber Processes attribute indicates if the AM models cyber processes of any form. This can be
observed in attacker models such as in [57] where Adepu models the plant control process which uses
sensor information to evaluate appropriate control actions, sending commands to various actuators.
Basin in [74] models authentication processes that occur in nodes on a wireless network. McEvoy’s
attacker model in [62] models in depth the SCADA communication process between several nodes
on a SCADA network. Modeling cyber processes is difficult without well-defined relationships
between components. As such, Cyber processes are most commonly observed in AMs developed
from the system component perspective and the individual attack perspective, AMs developed from
the vulnerability perspective tend to be process-agnostic.
Physical Processes
The physical side of cyber-physical systems adds a layer of complexity in requiring consideration of
not only the Cyber Processes but also the Physical Processes involved in modeling the CPS. Certain
attacker models simplify this by presenting a CPS model that considers the physical outcome as
an instantaneous result of the cyber-process rather than a process in itself. Other attacker models
separate the cyber and physical processes and use a unique method for representing the physical
process. For example, Adepu’s attacker model in [57] models all physical processes in the plant
and defines performance metrics to measure physical properties such as the pH of water in a water-
treatment process, the water level in the tank, and the flow rate of water through a pipe.
Orientation - Cyber and Physical
CPS Orientation is often partitioned into cyber orientation and physical orientation. While model-
ing physical processes are commonly observed in attacker modeling literature, the impact of spatial
orientation receives far less attention than does cyber orientation. Cyber orientation is a fundamen-
tal requirement of all attacker models and is the method that represents the relationship between
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various components in the system. Cyber orientation is often captured using communication meth-
ods such as those captured by the CPS Communication attribute such as in [5], [56], [62], [63],
[72]–[74], but can also be represented in more abstract form when simpler component associations
are necessary such as in [54], [55], [57], [59]. Physical orientation, however, is much less commonly
employed and can be observed in AMs such as Basin in [74] where the distance between wireless
nodes is used to measure the propagation delay of messages for range-based authentication. It can
also be observed in AMs such as [55], [63] where the physical orientation of various components is
used to model the relationships of process-based interactions between components and between the
attacker and components.
4.2.6 Attacker Behavior Attribute Category
The final sub-category of the Dimensions attribute category is the Attacker Behavior attribute
category. Attributes in this category identify how the attacker model implements the behavior of
the attacker. In the literature survey we only identified one attribute in the Attacker Behavior
category that is critical to SRP integration. The decision to include the Attacker Behavior as its
own category was made to clearly distinguish attributes related to the CPS Behavior from those
related to the Attacker Behavior, both being clearly distinguished from attributes related to the
interactions between the attacker and the CPS.
Attacker Knowledge Model
The attacker knowledge model identifies whether the attacker knowledge of the target system can
change over time. The options for the attacker knowledge model are static and dynamic. In the
instance of a static model, the attacker begins the attack with a full knowledge of all information
that will be used in the attack process. In the dynamic model, an attacker has the ability to learn
various types of information as the attack progresses. In [5] Deloglos models the attacker knowledge
as static with respect to resources and vulnerabilities, but dynamic with respect to known system
components. The attacker begins the attack with a limited initial knowledge of the system and only
has awareness of the systems that the attacker has control of, or that have direct communication
channels to systems the attacker has control of. From there the attacker learns the system as the
attack progresses. Attacker models such as Adepu’s in [57] claim the capability of employing both
forms of attacker knowledge models, although in Adepu’s case only the static model is demonstrated.
Mo in [72] demonstrates an attacker model that uses the individual component perspective in which
the attacker knowledge is defined as a static part of the attack procedure.
Dynamic attacker knowledge modules are valuable when trying to model the concept of an
intelligent and learning attacker. It should be noted, however, that exhaustive modeling of a dynamic
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Figure 4.4 Hierarchical input interface attributes for the attacker model characterization.
attacker can quick result in a state-space explosion.
4.3 Input Interface
The information required for an attacker model to execute is often not stated up front, but rather
requires effort and a holistic understanding of the attacker model to determine. When moving from
the theoretical evaluation of attackers to practical application in a security review process in the
context of a real and complex CPS, the effort of translating data from the attacker model to the
SRP without a consistent data taxonomy is considerable. At a base level, all attacker models require
as input some information about the attacker and the system to function. Categorically, attacker
models tend to take as input information about the CPS, attack vectors, and a description of the
attacker. The attributes used to describe each of these for the proposed AMC can be seen in Figure
4.4 and discussed in the sections below.
4.3.1 CPS Architecture
Despite the availability of frameworks for describing CPS topologies [67], [69], [77], attacker models
tend to utilize ad hoc methods, describing only the aspects of the CPS relevant to the attacker
model. In reviewing attacker models, five categories of input information were identified as being
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pertinent to the description of the CPS architecture as summarized in the CPS architecture attribute
category in Figure 4.4. It should be noted that attributes of the input interface are only intended to
capture a high-level description of the input information required by the AM. The functional form
of input information is provided by the attacker model functional representation and described in
Chapter 5.
Components
Beginning from an abstract view, a CPS is defined as a composition of system components, each be-
ing described by various properties. These properties are unique to each attacker model but usually
include device identifiers, device descriptions, cyber and/or physical orientation, and component
characteristics related to attack success and security compromise. The different dimensions of vari-
ous attacker models require different component properties. Both Adepu’s AM in [57] and Deloglos’
AM in [5] represents the CPS as an abstract domain model and requires as input to the system a
complete list of all components. Monteuuis’ AM in [56] uses the individual attack perspective and
models a static system architecture with all components predefined, thereby requiring no compo-
nents as input. Basin’s AM in [74], by contrast, requires as input descriptions of all components,
each defined with security protocols for authentication behavior.
Component Relationships
While all of the attacker models in some capacity describe the CPS components, not all models
take as input the relationships between them. Where the Cyber-Orientation attribute is present for
nearly all attacker models, many attacker models define the component orientations in the model
itself rather than taking the orientation as input to the model. Component relationships are a child
attribute of components and exist in all observed attacker models, but are implemented in a wide
variety of ways. This is observed in [55] and [54] which take as input variants of attack trees that
assume that the context of CPS component relationships has already been integrated to produce
attack chains. It is also observed in [56] and [72] which define the nature of the relationships between
CPS components as a part of the attacker modeling process rather than as input to the attacker
model. Relationships between components are often defined in terms of communication protocols
such as those characterized by the CPS Communications attribute of the contextual interface.
When considering the utility of different AMs in an SRP, the description of the component
relationships attribute is useful to quickly identify if the component relationship information defined
by the CPS architecture in the SRP is adequate to meet the requirements of the AM input interface.
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Process Properties
Several types of CPS process properties are identified in attributes of the contextual interface.
The process properties that are required as input to the AM are identified by Process Properties
attribute. The ability to take as input these system process properties and model property violation
in the context of the attacker model is a promising feature. Adepu’s AM in [57] defines a scope
of relevant system process properties and performance metrics which are required as input to the
attacker model. McEvoy’s AM is unique in that it models in great detail the process and properties
of a SCADA system. Process properties are provided to the model as input which define the
operations of sensor input, supervisor processes, and control loops. Orojloo in [55] demonstrates a
method for describing system process properties using fuzzy logic, which are expected as input to
the AM.
The amount of input information required by an AM has a significant influence on AM compat-
ibility. Depending on the scope of the SRP, architectural information such as process properties,
security protocols, and performance metrics may be unavailable and the effort required to develop
such properties or metrics increases exponentially as the CPS size and complexity increase.
Security Protocols
While security protocols and their effects on the attack process is an important aspect of CPS
security, they are not well explored in attacker modeling literature. Basin et al. [74] explores
protocol manipulation but also demonstrates that protocol descriptions are complex and require a
detailed security process model.
Performance Metrics
While most attacker models evaluate attack outcomes as the attacker succeeding or failing to attack,
more complex models may take as input performance metrics which are used to capture the system
operating in an altered or non ideal states.
4.3.2 Attack Vectors, CPS Associations, and Attacker Associations
Attack vectors are a standard component of all reviewed attacker models, although the level of
abstraction of the attack vector varies significantly between models. Like CPS components, attack
vectors each tend to be assigned various properties that describe the nature of the attack vector
and the vulnerabilities it exploits. The most significant architectural distinction between attacker
models is if and how they associate attack vectors to the CPS and/or to the attacker.
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CPS Associations
The three principle perspectives described in the contextual interface represent three different ap-
proaches that are used to model the relationship between the attacker, the attacks, and the CPS. For
all three perspectives, it is necessary to formulate a relationship between the various vulnerabilities
that the attacker exploits in an attack. As seen in Figure 4.3a the system component perspective
relates vulnerabilities to components in the CPS, then relates components to each-other through
the component relationships. For the vulnerability perspective in Figure 4.3b, vulnerabilities are
still associated to CPS components, but are directly related to each other. The critical implication
of this is that the vulnerability perspective assumes that the SRP can provide associations between
vulnerabilities in the target system. In [5], [57], [63], [73], the vulnerabilities are provided by the SRP
with associations to the CPS components they are related to. In [73], vulnerabilities are associated
to components using various actions, including remove, read/write, reveal, reprogram, and starve.
In [5], each component is defined with a list of associated vulnerabilities. In [59], attacker actions
and exploits are defined with a set of preconditions. Components that satisfy all preconditions are
then associated to attack actions.
Attacker Associations
Attacker associations are used to model how the attacker relates to the vulnerabilities and attacks.
This is most commonly realized in the form of attack selection. In [5], Deloglos’ attacker model
applies the same properties to attack vectors that are used to characterize attacker profiles. Vul-
nerability properties are associated to attacker properties using a probabilistic function to predict
vulnerability selection. Similarly, in [55], both attackers and attack steps are assigned four-property
profile values consisting of knowledge, access, user interaction, and skill, which are formulaically
associated. Because AMs developed using the individual attack perspective are designed for appli-
cation in a specific scenario, then can derive much more rigorous algorithms for relating the attacker
to vulnerabilities.
4.3.3 Attacker Description
Two primary techniques for describing the attacker are observed in the reviewed attacker models.
Profile-Defined Attacker
The first utilizes attacker profiling, a topic well explored in CPS security literature, in which various
properties of the attacker are captured as attributes and correlated to the attacker profile as in [5],
[54], [55], [57], [59]. An important distinction for the utility of a profile-based attacker model is
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whether the attacker profile is specific or generic, which is captured using the profile specificity child
attribute. Generic attacker models tend to offer more utility by allowing the experts driving the
security review process to define the attacker profile properties of interest. Rocchetto et al. provides
a summary of property-based attacker profiling techniques in attacker modeling literature [64].
Model-Defined Attacker
A second technique is observed when the nature of the attacker is not taken as input but rather is
defined by an objective comparison between the attacker and the system based on shared domains
of information in which they interact as in [56], [62], [63], [72]–[74]. Basin in [74] demonstrates this
by using the domains of time and agent/intruder location and applies them to physical properties
of the network.
4.4 Output Interface
Despite the purpose of attacker modeling being so closely linked with security assessment, a critical
question that is often not addressed in attacker modeling literature is, "How will the information
provided by the attacker model be useful to a security expert?". In order to integrate the AMF into
security process, we must first define what information from the AMF is of value and how it will be
useful in the context of a security analysis. The output of an attacker model is critical in determining
its compatibility to a security review process, and is often considered first in determining the value
provided by the attacker model. The output interface for the AMC is described by the set of five
categories of results we identified in our literature review. These can be seen in Figure 4.5.
4.4.1 Procedure
Attacker models that model procedures attempt to describe the process of how an attacker performs
an attack. These varied in level of abstraction from a high level of summarizing attacks as single
actions against the system as a whole, to low level evaluations of chains of vulnerability exploits
and the propagation of the attacker through the system. In [56], Monteuuis reasons about how
different attackers may go about performing attacks, resulting in a list of procedures that may
be exploited. This high-level analysis can be contrasted to the low-level attack simulation engine
developed by Ekelhart in [59] which implements an executable program that generates thousands
of detailed attack chains, explicitly identifying which steps in different attack procedures lead to
attack success or failure and, in the case of attack failure, documenting the failure mechanism.
Capturing the results of an attacker model is essential for developing a value proposition. We

























Figure 4.5 Hierarchical output interface attributes for the attacker model characterization
module.
many do so with the research intent of developing attacker modeling mechanisms rather then de-
veloping results that can be used for security assurance. To fill this deficit, we created a generic
procedure attribute capable of capturing the value proposition of the differing behaviors and proce-
dures of attacker models.
4.4.2 Security Metrics Violation
Security metrics is a child of the procedures result. Attacker models that modeled security metrics
take as input security properties about the CPS and provide as output instances where the attacker
violated those security properties. These metrics often include provision of service, violation of safe
behavior, and violation of time constraints. Basin in [74] developed an attacker model that modeled
the effects of interactions between the attacker and the system. Basin’s model bounded acceptable
system behavior using security protocols and identified attacker intrusion by monitoring deviations
from acceptable system behavior. Monteuuis in [56], by contrast, reasoned about the effects of
different types of attacks on various models of security goals.
Security metrics are a powerful tool that philosophically fall inline with much of the STPA [36]
style of thinking where security assessment is focused around the violation of bounded system
behaviors, which readily leads to discussions of safe and unsafe control actions. It may be expected
that the contextual attributes that contribute to the realization of this behavior in the attacker
model will match closely to those of similar styles of security review processes.
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4.4.3 Outcome Likelihood
While many attacker models identify possible attacker actions, attacker models with the outcome
likelihood attribute advance a step further to identifying the likelihood of various outcomes. In [5],
Deloglos’ attacker model calculates the likelihood of target selection and action selection at each
decision step made by the attacker. Similarly, Orojloo in [55] identifies the likelihood of different
decisions at different attack steps. In [59], Ekelhart’s AM used detailed attack characteristics to
execute large numbers of attack permutations which were evaluated to calculate likelihood of success
of different countermeasures.
One of the greatest challenges of providing outcome likelihoods is that likelihood values and
probability values are inherently subjective metrics and must be defended as such. This often leads
to a conversation of attacker model validation, which is one of the more challenging issues facing
attacker models. In Section 2.2.4 we identify that the progression of AM verification research requires
integration with security review processes to facilitate real-world validation. The groundwork laid
by our attacker modeling framework will help attacker models achieve validation goals by reducing
the burden of integrating AMs into SRPs.
4.4.4 Risk Assessment
Risk assessment is a common step in the security review process that is well explored in literature,
but is rarely observed in attacker models. Risk analysis normally combines the likelihood of attack
outcome with some cost and/or consequence evaluation in order to determine an objective measure
of risk. This can be seen in [55] where Orojloo develops a technique to calculate the risk of various
attacks from the attacker model.
The influence of the nature of an attacker on the risk to a CPS is difficult to objectively predict
from an attacker modeling perspective. Formal methods of analyzing, calculating, and predicting
risk lie on the security review process side of the gap between security review process literature and
attacker modeling literature. The lack of integration of attacker models into security process results
in a significant lacking of risk assessment practices in attacker modeling. However, the integration
of attacker models into security review processes provides significant opportunity for applying the
formal risk assessment methods of security research to integrated attacker models.
4.4.5 Security Properties
While several attacker models use security properties to some other end such as verifying system be-
havior or detecting and mitigating attacks, few produce security properties as a result of the attack.
In [72], Mo demonstrates an attacker model that formally derives security properties and counter-
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measures in conclusion to evaluation of the attacker behavior. Similarly, Basin in [74] demonstrates
a formal methodology for deriving security properties through a rigorous attacker model.
4.5 Attacker Model Characterization Examples and Findings
In order to demonstrate the capability of the AMC, a diverse set of attacker models was selected
and an AMC was created for each using the attributes described in this chapter. The tabular
documentation scheme we use can be seen in Table 4.1 for Adepu’s attacker model in [57]. This table
captures the entire set of attribute information and effectively represents the AMC for Adepu’s AM.
In total, we develop the AMCs for eleven diverse attacker models which can be seen in Appendix A.
For each attacker model, the AMC was demonstrated to capture the information necessary to define
the attributes of the input interface, contextual interface, and output interface.
The attribute documentation format of the set of an indicator and a description lends itself
well to evaluation at differing levels of abstraction. For more detail on a specific AM, the attribute
descriptions provide a useful summary for how the various attributes are realized in the attacker
model. For higher levels of abstraction, the indicator can allow rapid visualization of large amounts
of data. For example, Table 4.2 effectively presents the attribute indicator values for the contextual,
input, and output interfaces for all eleven AMCs. This provides a high-level analysis of what
attributes are realized across the spectrum of the attacker models documented.
4.6 Security Review Process Characterization
The value in having an AMC or a database of AMCs is realized when it can be associated with a
security review process. In order to associate an SRP with an AMC, the SRP must be described in
the context of the various attributes in the AMC. This is done by creating a security review process
characterization (SRPC), which has the same attributes as the AMC but is evaluated from a different
perspective. Where the AMC is describing the attributes included in the attacker model, the SRPC
describes how the various attacker model attributes influence their compatibility and/or value to
the SRP. This can fundamentally be observed by the different questions asked when completing
an AMC versus when completing an SRPC. Where the AMC answers the same question for each
attribute in each interface, namely, "Does the Attacker Model consider this attribute?", the question
for each interface of the SRPC is different. For attributes in the input interface, the SRPC answers
the question, "Is the SRP able to provide the information required for this attribute to an attacker
model?". For attributes in the contextual interface, the SRPC answers the question, "Does the
SRP recognize the concept of this attribute as being valid?". For attributes in the output interface,
the SRPC answers the question, "What resulting information does the SRP want from the attacker
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Table 4.1 The attacker model characterization for the attacker model developed by Adepu
et al. in [57]
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Table 4.2 The attribute indicators summarized for the eleven attacker models in Ap-
pendix A
General:{T=True, F=False}, Principle Perspective:{C=System Component Perspective,
V=Vulnerability Perspective, I=Individual Attack Perspective}, Operational
Method:{S=Sequential, D=Discrete Time, C=Continuous Time}, Attack Procedure:{P=Process,
Q=Qualification}, Attacker Knowledge Model:{S=Static, D=Dynamic}
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model?". The process of evaluating the compatibility and utility of a particular AM to an SRP then
is done by comparing the SRPC to the AMC. The structured integration workflow for this process





In Chapter 3 we gave an overview of our Attacker Modeling Framework and identified that it is
composed of two primary modules, which we call the Attacker Model Characterization (AMC),
and the Attacker Model Functional Representation (AMFR). In Chapter 4 we discussed in depth
the AMC. In this chapter, we describe the attacker model functional representation (AMFR). The
purpose of the AMFR is to capture the functional basis of how the attacker model works. Where
the AMC describes the various attributes of the attacker model, the AMFR captures at a high level
how those attributes are realized.
Attacker models vary drastically in form and function, which makes developing a single func-
tional representation framework to describe this diverse set a challenge. In Chapter 4 we reviewed
several attacker models which demonstrate a diverse range of functional definition. These models
ranged in complexity from high-level methods of reasoning about attacker behavior [56] to rigorously
formalized AMs composed from Pi-calculus [62] or described by system-theoretic models [63]. These
models also range in form from AMs that model the attacker behavior through a single sequence
of steps [57] to AMs that model attacker behavior as a feedback loop [5]. Describing this range of
attacker models requires the AMFR be defined at a certain level of abstraction that can capture
the functional representation of AMs without manifesting structure or syntax that precludes the
description of other types of AMs. As such, the AMFR we develop is intended to serve as an in-
termediary between the abstract description provided by the AMC and the full level of detail that
would be required for complete implementation of the AM.
5.1 Composition of the Attacker Model Functional Representation
Traditional attacker behavior is captured as a series of observations regarding the attacker’s motiva-
tions and the attacker’s decision process. This is captured in the proposed AMFR as a meta-model
51























Figure 5.1 An example attacker model functional representation and its diagram with
relationships between hypothetical modules "Module 1" and "Module 2" that utilize a
variable "Variable 1" and a constant "Constant 1" and have a resulting variable "Results".
composed of modules, constants, and variables, all connected by relationships that characterize the
flow of information where components are defined as being producers and/or consumers of data.
These components together describe the functional behavior of the attacker model. As seen in Fig-
ure 5.1, the AMFR is developed as a tabular document describing the various AMFR components
for the attacker model. This document may be used to generate a graphical representation of the
AMFR which is seen as an example AMFR diagram.
5.1.1 A Word on Scope
We adopt the concept of scope to describe the level of decomposition at which the components
of the AMFR (modules, constants, variables, and relationships) capture the functional behavior of
the attacker model. The diversity of attacker models makes it difficult to define an appropriate
scope for modules, constants, variables, and relationships that does not inhibit the description of
other AMs created at a higher or lower level of abstraction. As such, for each component we




The decision process of the AM is captured in the proposed AMFR in several modules, each being
composed of one or more rules. A module captures a bounded component of the functionality of
the AM. A rule may be defined as a facet of an attacker’s behavior which observes a cause/effect
relationship between an influencing parameter and the attacker’s actions. The proposed AMFR
accepts a series of rules in each module, which together compose the functional representation of
the decision process of the unique attacker model.
A module represents a functional component of the attacker model that takes input data, per-
forms one or more operations, and then produces a result. Decomposing the functional implemen-
tation of an attacker model into the components of an AMFR necessitates the identification of
boundaries around functionality that follow this input/operation/output module structure. The
motivation for module boundary selection is to partition an attacker model into the fewest num-
ber of functional steps possible that effectively captures how the primary functional mechanisms in
the attacker model leverage the input data initially provided to the attacker model to produce the
output results produced by the attacker model. It is a common practice in attacker modeling to
capture the functionality of the attacker model as an algorithm, flowchart, or other type of process
diagram. These representations often serve as a good starting point for defining modules where
operative steps in flowcharts or operations in an algorithm identify bounded functionality which
can be partitioned into a single module. Each attacker model studied in the literature survey could
be clearly represented with four to twelve modules per attacker model. Examples of modules are
provided in the AMFR case studies in Sections 5.2 and 5.3.
This module-based methodology allows the representation of a wide variety of attacker behaviors
from a diverse set of AM structures. In the case of AM development, this provides a test-bed to
explore the role and influence of individual modules on the composite attacker decision process.
This also provides a flexible framework that allows validation of the AMFR against a particular
data-set where the rules that the AMFR implements may be refined and calibrated to achieve a
model that accurately reflects the behavior of a known attacker or set of attackers. Modules are
documented in the AMFR as the tuple of an ID, a title, a short description of the purpose of the
module, and a set of rules defining the behavior of the module.
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Example Module and Rule
When considering an attacker model that simulates an attacker performing an attack on a
system, a critical behavior of the attacker will be the process by which the attacker selects the
next target. In an AMFR, this may be represented as the module, "Target Selection Process".
This module may be composed of several rules including, but not limited to, qualification
rules such as "Attacker will not select a target it has not discovered", capability rules such as
"Attacker will not select a target if the attacker has no exploits/resources for attacking that
target", and preferential rules such as "Attacker will prefer targets of higher value". This
would be captured in the AMFR as, {M1, "Target Selection Process", "Rule 1:...", "Rule
2:...", "Rule 3:..."}.
5.1.3 Constants
The first data type in the AMFR is the constant. A constant is any static datum or set of data that
is not subject to change through the duration of the attack. The data in a constant is created before
the execution of the attacker model. A constant is not capable of receiving data from variables or
modules, but may provide data to either. A constant is intended to capture a collection of data
with consistent or mostly consistent structure at the highest level of abstraction possible that does
not include operative functionality.
Constants are documented in the AMFR as the tuple of an ID, a title, a short description of
the data held in the constant, and a description of the expected origin of the data. The data for
constants can be produced in one of two ways. First, it can be developed prior to the execution
of the attacker model as the result of a preparatory step defined in the AM. Second, it can be
provided from the SRP to the AM as input information which is provided prior to the execution
of the attacker model. In the case of data provided by the SRP, the AMFR constant should be
documented with as much detail as possible regarding the structure of the data. This is applied




Consider a module that captures the attacker’s process of selecting a target node as a Target
Selection Process. In order to execute, this module may require several pieces of information
such as the architecture of the CPS or a list of available actions. Many attacker models
take as input a description of the CPS architecture and do not modify it through the attack
process. Such a CPS architecture would be considered a constant as it is not subject to
change. Similarly, if the AM treats the set of actions available to the attacker as a predefined
list, it is considered a constant. This would be captured as, {C1, "Attack Actions", "Contains
all actions available to the attacker. Data provided by SRP.", {ID, Name, Targets, Profile
Properties}} where the ID, Name, Targets, and Profile Properties fields represent the structure
of data expected for each action in the database. However, if the attacker is modeled as having
the ability to learn new actions as the attack progresses, then the list of available actions would
not be a constant, but rather is considered a variable.
5.1.4 Variables
Variables are the second type data in the AMFR and represent any data that is subject to change
throughout the course of the attack. The distinction between static constants and dynamic variables
in attacker models has significant implications on how the attacker model must use that data. For a
constant, an AMFR must only define the structure of the data. For a variable the AMFR must define
the structure of the data, as well as the process by which that data may change. We define variables
as being able to implement a set of rules that describe how input data modifies the internal data of
the variable. Variables are capable of taking input that is used to modify the internal data and are
capable of providing output to other variables or modules. As such, variables are documented in
the AMFR as the tuple of an ID, a title, a description of the data, and one or more rules defining
how the data in the variable is manipulated.
Example Variables
Consider the example module "Target Selection Process". This module may require as input
data such as a list of nodes that have already been targeted. The list of nodes that have been
targeted, however, changes as the attack progresses and is therefore classified as a variable.
This may be represented as the set, {V1, "Targeted Node List", "A list of nodes already
targeted by the attacker", "Rule 1: If the attacker targets a node, the attacker becomes aware
of the node, and it is added to this list."}.
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5.1.5 Relationship
Relationships in the AMFR follow a node-edge format and serve to capture the flow of data between
constants, variables, and modules in the AMFR. Relationships are described in the AMFR as the
tuple of an ID, a title, a description of the data that is passed, the data source, and the data
destination(s). In the case of relationships that originate from constants or variables, we define the
relationship description of self, which may be used to represent the relationship as the provision of
the full set of data in the originating constant or variable.
Example Relationship
Consider the example module "Target Selection Process" which takes as input a list of nodes
in the target system. The architecture would likely be provided from a "CPS Architecture"
constant as a subset of the constant’s data. The relationship would be represented as that
from the constant to the Target Selection Process module. This may be represented as, {R1,
"CPS Node List", "A list of all nodes the CPS", C1/M1 } where C1 is the CPS Architecture
constant’s ID and M1 is the Target Selection Process Module’s ID.
5.1.6 Results
The results of the attacker model are captured by the AMFR using the same semantics as a variable.
The Results variable receives data via relationships and produces the output data from the AM,
which is provided to the SRP. Similar to other variables, the Results variable is documented as
the tuple of an ID, the title "Results", a description of the results captured, and a set of rules
implemented to produce the output data. In addition, the results variable should capture in as
much detail as possible the structure of the resulting data. This is used during the integration when
mapping the result data from the AM to the results data expected by the SRP.
Example Result
Consider an attacker model that provides as output the expected attack path of the attacker.
This could be captured as, {V3, "Results", "The results of the attack including the attack
path", "Rule 1:...", "Rule 2:..."}.
5.1.7 AMFR Diagrams
The AMFR can be visually represented as a diagram where the symbols for modules, constants,
variables, and relationships can be seen in Figure 5.1. The purpose of the diagram is to clearly
provide a visual representation of the flow of data and process in the attacker model. In the
56
instance of a module, variable, or constant with a number of relationships that inhibits clarity in
the diagram, we adopt the relationships syntax of {<Source ID>, <Relationship ID>, <Destination
ID>} which can be added to a component in the diagram in place of an arrow.
Relationships between modules are characterized by connected arrows, where upstream modules
occur earlier in the attacker decision process. The flow of data between constants, variables, and
modules is captured using relationships as seen in the example AMFR diagram in Figure 5.1. This
diagram shows the relationships between modulesM1 andM2, constant C1, and variable V1 and V2,
as R1, R2, R3, R4, and R5. P1 is a static constant which is passed entirely to M2 and partially to
V1, where the subset of P1 passed to V1 is captured in the description of R2. Variable V1 captures
the data from P1 and applies via an internal rule or set of rules, then passes the entirety of its data
to moduleM1. ModuleM1 performs operations on the received data in accordance with the rules it
implements, then passes the data specified in R4 to module M2. Module M2 performs an operation
and passed the resulting data to V2 via R5 which is the final step in the process. R5 may provide
the data as output, or else implement a rule or set of rules that processes the data into its final
form. While the structure of the AMFR is simple in form, it is powerful in being able to capture
the functional representation of a wide diversity of attacker models.
5.1.8 How the AMC Informs the AMFR
While the AMC and the AMFR are two functionally separate modules and can be applied inde-
pendently to the attacker model to achieve their respective goals, a completed AMC can be used
to inform the AMFR in the definition of constants, variables, and modules. Because the attributes
in the AMC only represent the subset of attributes which are relevant to integration with an SRP,
an AMC alone does not provide enough information to create the full AMFR. The attributes in the
various interfaces can, however, be useful in identifying several constants, variables, and modules.
Attributes in the input interface of the AMC identify the information expected by the attacker
model as input, which may indicate constants in the AMFR. Attributes in the contextual interface
of the AMC, particularly those of the Attacker/CPS Interaction attribute category, may indicate
mechanisms in the attacker model that can be directly captured as modules or decomposed into
modules. Attributes in the AMC output interface may identify the output variable of the AMFR.
Therefore, while the AMFR can be developed through direct analysis of the attacker model, the
characterization of the attacker model in the AMC aids by capturing a subset of those modules.
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5.2 AMFR Case Study: Adepu’s Attacker Model [57]
Adepu et al. developed a generalized attacker and attack model targeting cyber-physical systems.
Adepu’s model is designed to model a diverse set of system architectures with varying performance
metrics and system properties under attack by a unique attacker with varying intents, start and
end goals, and capabilities. Rather than providing a generalized description of Adepu’s AM which
may or may not be clear and may or may not capture the important information, we created the
AMC for Adepu’s attacker model which can be seen in Table 5.1 and effectively describes all the
attributes about Adepu’s model that are critical to our goal of integration with a security review
process.
From Adepu’s model we generated the AMFR. The most useful approach to reading attacker
modeling literature and generating an AMFR will likely change from model to model. We hypoth-
esize that the information to compose the AMFR can most easily be gathered by identifying which
AMFR component type is most clearly defined in the literature, describing all instances of that
component type, and then progressing to the next most clearly defined component type.
The workflow we found most helpful in generating the AMFR for Adepu’s AM was the following:
1. Define all modules (Name and Description)
2. Define all variables (Name and Description)
3. Define all constants (Name and Description)
4. Define all relationships (Name, Description, and Source/Destination)
5. Update all relationships (ID)
6. Update all constants (ID and Constant Composition)
7. Update all variables (ID and Rules)
8. Update all modules (ID and Rules)
In this workflow, returning to the IDs once all components and relationships were defined was
simply used to allow us to easily assign ID numbers in the order of progression of the AMFR
relationships. While we do not formally define any method for choosing the ID values, we recognize
the human tendency to put significance on sequential numbers. Defining our module, property,
constant, and relationship ID values as the first letter prefix (M, P, C, or R respectively) followed
by the number representing the order of relationship in the AMFR adds clarity to the AMFR
diagram.
The AMFR for Adepu’s AM can be seen in Table 5.2. Using the AMFR, we were able to
effectively decompose Adepu’s AM into module-sized components. We were able to identify the
input data required by the model as constants, and we were able to capture the results of the model
as a variable. All modules, constants, and variables were then associated using relationships. The
AMFR diagram was created from the AMFR and can be seen in Figure 5.2.
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Table 5.1 Tabulated attacker model characterization data for Adepu’s attacker model [57]
T=True, F=False, System Component Perspective, V=Vulnerability Perspective, I=Individual
Attack Perspective, C=Continuous Time, P=Process, D=Dynamic
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Figure 5.2 The attacker model from Adepu et al. [57] implemented using the attacker
model functional representation.
Figure 5.3 The 5-stage process for deriving attacks for a CPS using Adepu’s attacker
model (Image taken from [57]).
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5.2.1 Conclusions of Adepu’s AMFR
Adepu’s attacker model was created as a 5-stage process and in the publication [57] Adepu created
Figure 5.3 which captures this process as a diagram. We notice a key fundamental difference
between Adepu’s process diagram and the AMFR diagram that would make an AMFR diagram
a valuable addition in Adepu’s publication. First, Adepu’s diagram, as is common in attacker
modeling literature, was developed around a theoretical perspective. As such, the abstraction of the
diagram may be conducive to interpreting the theory being applied, but it is not particularly useful
for functional interpretation. In order to collect the necessary information to trace the data flow
through the process, we had to read through the entire document, taking notes of the set notation
used to characterize the various data elements, then compose that data into the constants, variables,
and relationships in the AMFR. While Adepu labeled several of the data elements in the diagram,
the functional components that relate them are not clear from the diagram and must be interpreted
from set notation. To an expert in the same domain, this documentation scheme is expected and
appropriate. When considering an expert in applied cyber-security who may not be familiar with the
theoretical semantics and notation in Adepu’s publication, the effort to functionally interpret this
attacker model could be inhibiting. We propose that in a publication such as Adepu’s, the functional
implementation of the attacker model could be readily captured by including our tabulated AMFR
and AMFR diagram in an appendix.
5.3 AMFR Case Study: Our Own Attacker Model
The early research of this dissertation was formative in understanding attacker models and how
to design, create, and apply them. In the course of this discovery, we created our own attacker
model to explore certain aspects of probabilistic attacker behavioral prediction. While the attacker
model was not comprehensive, as most are not, the probabilistic behavior was considered novel
and published in [5]. Our AM serves as a good case study to explore the more meticulous aspects
documenting the AMFR modules, variables, constants, and relationships. As such, in this section
we walk through the development of our attacker model in parallel with the process of creating the
AMFR for the attacker model. In order to clearly distinguish the AMFR from the attacker model
itself, we note that the AMFR in its entirety can be seen in Table B.2 in Appendix B and the
AMFR diagram created from the table can be seen in Figure 5.7 at the conclusion of this section.
Throughout the case study, in order to clarify the distinction between the AMFR and the attacker
model, the attacker model is referred to in the third-person as Deloglos’ attacker model. We also
note that the variables and syntax used for the formulation of the attacker model are not included
in the table of variables for this dissertation. The full documentation of the attacker model variables
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can be found in the original publication in [5].
The attacker model created by Deloglos is a probabilistic attacker model that leverages attacker
profiling to predict the behavior of a non-deterministic attacker. The attacker model functional
representation in Figure 5.7 depicts the relationship between the attacker and the CPS as a feedback
loop which cycles through an attacker target selection and action selection process, iterating step
by step through the decision process used to perform the attack. Rules defining attacker behavior
are implemented in modules such as the CPS Knowledge and the Target Node Selection modules.
In Deloglos’ cyclical action/feedback scheme, an action is some step the attacker performs in
the attack process and feedback is any information the attacker receives as a result of the action.
The results of the attack on the CPS is captured as the progression of the attack state. The attack
state represents all data in a single cycle of the AM which is a tuple of the selected action as well
as all static constants and dynamic variables in the AMFR.
5.3.1 Cyber-Physical System Architecture
In Deloglos’ attacker model, the CPS is modeled and described as a simplified composition of
nodes, edges, attack vectors, and entry points. A node represents a machine or other potentially
vulnerable device that has functional purpose within the CPS. An edge represents a communication
link between two nodes that may be used to transmit information, while an attack vector is any edge
that may be used for an attack. An entry point is an edge directed into the CPS from outside the CPS
that may be used by an attacker to gain access to the system. Establishing well-formed boundaries
between nodes of the CPS and relationships between them allows the composite description of a
Cyber-Physical System. Many programming tools and languages such as SysML [78] utilize the
node/edge system description scheme and may be readily integrated with the CPS design process
for attacker model automation.
5.3.2 Action Simulator
The action simulator is implemented using a qualification-based process. It takes as input the
action being performed by the attacker as R5 and the CPS architecture and produces as feedback
the result of the action as R1. The action simulator implements the following rules for action success
evaluation.
• The action does not succeed if the target node does not meet the target criteria of the selected
action.
• The action does not succeed if all prerequisite actions for the selected action have not been
completed.
• Feedback is provided to the attacker upon success or failure of an action.
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The feedback from the action simulator includes action success or failure, as well as any descriptive
information associated with action success.
5.3.3 CPS Knowledge
Capturing the nature of how an attacker learns about a CPS as an attack progresses is often ignored
in attacker models where an underlying assumption is made that the attacker is aware of (or has
vision of) the full system description. In evaluating attacker behavior Deloglos begins by making
the assumption that as the attack or probing progresses, the attacker will begin to learn information
about the target system. This behavior is captured in the CPS knowledge module which takes as
input the action feedback as R1 and the attacker initial knowledge from P2. The rules that the CPS
knowledge module implements are:
• When starting an attack, the attacker only has knowledge of the system entry points.
• As the attack progresses the attacker will discover new information about the CPS.
• If a node is compromised, all nodes it is connected to are discovered and added to the CPS
knowledge.
Information about the CPS is fed into the attacker’s CPS knowledge module as feedback. If a node is
compromised it is considered owned by the attacker and capable of performing pivoting attacks. The
initial attacker CPS knowledge is simplified for demonstration purposes in the preliminary research,
but in a more complex application could include behaviors involving the attacker’s discovery of the
target system.
5.3.4 Target Node Selection
When the attacker goes to perform an action against a system, the attacker must first select a target
node. The target node selection module takes as input the full data set of the CPS knowledge
variable and produces a set of valid targets as R2. The rules that the target node selection module
implements are:
• The attacker will only target nodes that exist in the attacker’s CPS Knowledge.
• The attacker will not target a node if it is already compromised.
• The attacker will not target a node if all qualified actions have been exhausted.
• If an attacker targets a node, the attacker will not change targets until all actions against it
are exhausted.




The Action Database property contains the set of all actions available to the attacker. Each action
within the database contains several fields of information including the action profile, the action
description, the target criteria, and a list of prerequisite actions. The action profile contains a
quantitative description of the user and use case of the action, which is used for quantifying a
relationship between each action and the attacker profile defined for the attacker model as discussed
further in section 5.3.9. The action description is a plain-text description of how the action works in
as much detail as is possible. The target criteria defines what system(s) the action is valid against.
The prerequisite attacks describe any actions that must be completed before this action may be
attempted.
A critical component to the viability of the attacker model is the action database population
scheme. CAPEC [39], CWE[40], CVE[41], and CPE [42] are amongst the most popular vulnerability
databases and provide different approaches to cataloging attacks, attack descriptions, and attack
relationships. Search engines that make use of online attack and vulnerability databases aid in
effectively generating an action database for the attacker model. One tool that Deloglos applied
to populate the action database when demonstrating his AM was the CYBOK tool [38], which is
a literal search engine for CAPEC, CWE, and CVE capable of generating vulnerability data for
individual queries or entire systems.
5.3.6 One-Step Look-Ahead Generator
The one-step look-ahead generator applies the attacker’s knowledge of the CPS to filter out all
attacks that are invalid for the current attack state. Filters are non-probabilistic in nature and may
depend on any information regarding the current state of the attack or the description of the node.
This module takes as input the full set of the attacker’s CPS knowledge from V 1 as well as the
selected target from M2. This attacker model applies three filters as rules and produces as output
R3 which is the full set of actions that are valid given the target node and the state of the attack.
1. The attacker will only consider actions that meet the target criteria
2. The attacker will not consider an action that has already been performed on the target
3. The attacker will not consider an action if the edge relating the current node to the target
node is not a viable propagation path for that action
Deloglos defines A as the set of all m known actions in the action database and Φ ⊆ A as the set of
actions known by the attacker. The three filters are defined as Φtarget ⊆ Φ, Φex ⊆ Φ, and Φvect ⊆ Φ
for filters 1, 2, and 3 respectively. The set of actions that are valid for the attacker to perform in








Figure 5.4 The intersection of action selection filters applied to the action database.
be visualized in Figure 5.4.
Φvalid = Φex ∩ Φvect ∩ Φtarget (5.1)
5.3.7 Probabilistic Attacker Profile
Attacker profiles are a topic well covered in literature with no recognized standards for what char-
acteristics best model an attacker. The purpose of an attacker profile is to capture characteristics
about an attacker that influence the attacker’s behavior, thereby describing the expected behavior
of the attacker. The characteristics that define the attacker profile are termed attacker properties.
Rocchetto et al. [64] performed a literature review on attacker profiles for CPSs in an attempt to
find a unifying attacker profiling model to describe various attackers from multiple different research
studies. In conclusion, Rocchetto proposed a set of six attacker profiles composed of twenty-nine
attacker properties that effectively described the majority of attacker profiles in the referenced
literature.
In applying Rocchetto’s attacker profiles to an attacker model it is important to note that in
a real-world application one cannot assume which attacker will be attacking a system. In order to
simulate this non-deterministic behavior, two types of attacker profiles are adopted which are the
static attacker profile and the probabilistic attacker profile. A static attacker profile represents one
of the six attacker profiles defined by Rocchetto et al. [64]. A probabilistic attacker profile may
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be represented as a probability mass function (PMF) of the six profiles. The PMF is generated
by assigning each of the six attacker profiles (∆1, . . . ,∆6) a likelihood of attacking (li) such that







j=1 P (∆j) = 1. The PMF in Figure 5.6 is an example probabilistic attacker profile designed
to mimic the probability of attackers against a nuclear power plant.
5.3.8 Attacker Profile Selection
The Attacker Profile variable V2 takes as input the probabilistic attacker profile data from P4 and
uses it to non-deterministically select an attacker profile. This is the mechanism used by Deloglos
to simulate the lack of ability to deterministically predict the nature of an attacker. The rules
implemented by V2 are as follows.
• At the beginning of the attack execution, the probabilistic attacker profile is sampled to obtain
a discrete attacker profile.
• The discrete attacker profile is only sampled once and is recognized as the attacker for the
remainder of the attack process.
5.3.9 Action Assessment
The influence of the attacker characteristics on how the attacker selects an action is a behavior
captured in the action assessment module, M4. The action assessment model takes as input R3
from M3 which contains the full set of actions valid for the attacker to perform given the attack
state, as well as the description of the selected target node. The rules applied here are the following.
• Actions may have properties that allow them to be correlated to an attacker.
• An attacker’s attack selection decision can be predicted by evaluating the sum of influencing
factors between an attacker and an action.
The action assessment module calculates the probability of the attacker performing each of the
actions based on probability functions that take as operands the attacker profile, the attack profile,
and the current state of the attack.
Action Profiles
An action profile is often represented as a set of properties describing the characteristics of the
action [64]. This, however, implies linear proportionality to an attacker profile, which is not univer-
sally true. For example, an attacker with a high skill set is not necessarily more likely to perform an
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Figure 5.5 An example three-
dimensional attack space showing the
attacker profile and several action
profiles.
Figure 5.6 An example of a probabil-
ity mass function for a probabilistic at-
tacker profile against a nuclear power
plant.
attack that requires a high skill set when an easier attack may succeed as well. Deloglos captures
this behavior by defining an attack profile as the profile of the attacker expected to use that attack.
Because attacker behavior is constantly changing as technology evolves, this profiling technique may
be reinforced by empirical data from records of attack history. Collaborations such as MITRE’s
ATT&CK framework [79] may aid in the assessment of current threat actors. This facilitates an
attacker model that can better emulate realistic and relevant threats by allowing the user to base
the relationship between attackers and their actions off of current attacker data.
As such, Deloglos defines an attacker profile (∆) as an n-dimensional space of attacker properties
(δi) such that ∆ = {δ1, δ2, . . . , δn} for an attacker profile having n properties. An example attack
space can be seen in Figure 5.5 where the attacker profile and several action profiles are plotted in
the 3-dimensional space. The probability of an attacker performing an action is a function of the
distance between the attacker profile and the action profile in n-dimensional space.
Attack Probability Functions
The probability that the attacker will perform an attack at any given time is calculated using the
attack probability function. Attacker properties may be one of three types which are sets, bounded
ranges, and unbounded ranges. Non-ordered sets are considered to have a scaled property value
γ = 1 if the attacker profile property and the attack profile property match and γ = 0 otherwise.
Ordered set values may be mapped to the scaled property range (0 ≤ γ ≤ 1) using fuzzy set theory
as demonstrated by Patil et al. in [80].
Bounded ranges are numerical ranges where the value of a property (ε) may only fall between
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a lower bound (εL) and an upper bound (εH). Bounded ranges are linearly mapped to the scaled





Several scaling functions exist for unbounded ranges such as the percent-difference function, the
logistic function, and the hyperbolic tangent. The value weighting in these functions, however, is
non-linear, which does not properly scale different property values where a score considered median is
represented by a numerically large or numerically small value (>100 or <1 respectively). Therefore,
Deloglos proposes converting the unbounded property values to a bounded range by first evaluating
the maximum (γmax) and minimum (γmin) values for all actions within the database, then using
the local maximum and minimum to scale the unbounded range.
Deloglos designates the set ofm available actions in the action database asA = {A1, A2, . . . , Am}.
Each action Ai (i = 1, 2, . . . ,m) has an associated set of scaled property values Γi = {γ1i , γ2i , . . . , γni }.
For a given attacker profile (∆) with n scaled property values Θ = {θ1, θ2, . . . , θn}, the distance
(di) between the attacker and each action is calculated by the distance between the two profiles in
n-dimensional space using:









where βj is a criticality factor such that {β ∈ R|0 ≤ β ≤ 1} which increases the distance for
properties with a β < 1 criticality. The score of each action (si) is inversely proportional to di and




i = 1, . . . ,m (5.5)
This equation is unique in that it calculates the inverse of the distance without applying a nonlinear
value-weighting as is observed in the inverse function or exponential functions such as the Softmax
function. According to the score for each action, the probability that the attacker will take action





Equation (5.6) has the intuitive interpretation that the higher the score the attacker gets for an
action, the higher the probability that this action will be chosen by the attacker.
5.3.10 Action Sampler
The last module in the attacker model is the action sampler module. The action sampler module
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Figure 5.7 Attacker model from Deloglos et al. [5] implemented using the attacker model
functional representation.
• After evaluating the actions, the attacker is more likely to choose an action with a high
probability than an attack with a low probability.
The action sampler receives as input R4 which contains all attacks for the target system with
their attack probability values and selects one of the actions by sampling a weighted randomizing
function (randw()) mapped to the probabilities of the set of probabilistic actions ∆ = {Ai, P [Ai]}.
This action is then performed by the attacker against the CPS.
5.3.11 Results
The results of the attacker model are captured as a partially observable Markov Model which uses
the probabilities of target selection and action selection, along with the decision of the target and
action selected to represent the attack path chosen by the attacker. The rule that the Results
variable implements is as follows.
• The attack process is modeled as an alternating branching decision tree of the sequence of
target selection and action selection.
5.4 Attacker Model Findings
All modules, properties, variables, and relationships necessary to compose the attacker model func-
tional representation were described in the previous section. In order to distinguish the AMFR
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Figure 5.8 Attacker model case study ICS relational diagram.
from the AM in itself, the complete AMFR is captured in Appendix B in Table B.2. The complete
diagram for the Deloglos’ AMFR can be seen in Figure B.2.
For application of the preliminary Attacker Model, Deloglos demonstrated an attack on the
Industrial Control System (ICS) in Figure 5.8 which is composed of nodes and communication
channels. This example ICS is used to control a simulated exothermic continuous stirred tank
reactor (CSTR) using an NI cRIO controller. The target for the attack is the Basic Process Control
System (BPCS, N4). Control or disruption of the BPCS by the attacker indicates a successful
attack.
5.4.1 ICS Architecture
The ICS consists of the 7 nodes in Table 5.5, each composed of key attributes included in Fig-
ure 5.8. The system is described as having 4 entry points in Table 5.6 which include N1, N2, and
N6 via infected USB and N7 via remote access. Six properties are selected as a subset of those
described by Rocchetto et al. [64] to describe the attacker and action profiles which include Access,
Finances, Knowledge, Manpower, Motivation, and Tools. Access, Motivation, and Tools are defined
as set properties with values of {Direct, Wireless, Offsite} for Access and {Low, Medium, High}
for Motivation and for Tools. Knowledge is defined as a bounded property with a 0 ≤ Knowledge
≤ 10 range. Finances and Manpower are defined as unbounded properties. These properties are
not intended to be a holistic description of the attacker behavior, but rather to demonstrate the
principles and dynamics of the different types of profile properties. The criticality factor is kept at
unity (1) for all profile properties. The attacker profile PMF in Figure 5.6 was defined as a set of
6 attacker profiles with property values in Table 5.3. CAPEC, CWE, CVE, and CPE databases
were used to search for vulnerability information. The CAPEC and CWE databases were used to
identify potential attack patterns and weaknesses respectively, aiding in the discovery of associated
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Table 5.3 Attacker profiles and property values
Profile Access Finances Knowledge Manpower Motivation Tools
Basic User Offsite 100 2 40 Low Low
Cybercriminal Offsite 1000 5 160 Medium High
Hactivist Wireless 500 6 1500 High Medium
Insider Onsite 100 7 10 Medium Medium
Nation State Offsite 1000000 9 100000 High High
Terrorist Onsite 10000 4 1000 High Medium
Table 5.4 Case study action profiles
ID Name Targets A F K Mp Mo T
V1 Remote-Access Trojan Windows 7 Machine Offsite 0 3 20 Low Low
V2 CVE-2017-2779 Windows 7 Machine Onsite 10000 9 5000 High Mid
V3 CVE-2017-2775 Windows 7 Machine Offsite 6000 10 8000 High Mid
V4 MODBUS MITM NI cRIO 9064/9063 Onsite 50000 9 500 High Mid
V5 MODBUS DOS NI cRIO 9064/9063 Offsite 40000 6 200 High Mid
V6 Code Injection NI cRIO 9064 Onsite 100 4 300 Mid Low
V7 Watering-Hole Windows 7 Machine Offsite 2000 6 300 Mid Mid
V8 CVE-2014-4115 Windows 7 Machine Onsite 1200 7 800 High High
V9 CVE-2010-2568 Windows 7 Machine Onsite 10000 8 2000 High High
V10 CVE-2019-1713 Cisco ASA Offsite 5000 9 100 High Mid
A=Access, F=Finances, K=Knowledge, Mp=Manpower, Mo=Motivation, T=Tools
CVEs. Table 5.4 contains a sample profile set for the vulnerabilities found for the ICS nodes. In
Section 5.4 the variable V represents vulnerability IDs. The variable is reclaimed in later chapters.
5.4.2 Executing the Attacker Model
The following sections detail a single cycle of the attack/feedback process.
Sampling the attacker profile
Sampling the attacker PMF at the beginning of the attack process determines the profile of the
attacker performing this attack. This is done by mapping a random function to the probability
values of each attacker type. In this instance, the attacker selected is the Nation State.
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Table 5.5 Case study nodes
ID Name Type
N1 Programming WS Windows 7 Machine
N2 Monitoring WS Windows 7 Machine
N3 SIS NI cRIO 9064
N4 BPCS NI cRIO 9064
N5 RT Simulation NI cRIO 9063
N6 Interaction PC Windows 7 Machine
N7 Firewall Cisco ASA
Table 5.6 Case study entry points
ID Node Mechanism
E1 N1 Infected USB
E2 N2 Infected USB
E3 N6 Infected USB
E4 N7 Remote Access
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Table 5.7 Case study step 1 calculated values against node N1
ID Distance Score Probability
V1 2.088 0.6428 0.3214
V7 2.0199 0.6545 0.3272
V8 1.7383 0.7027 0.3513
Target node selection
The attack process in Figure B.2 begins with the evaluation of the Attacker CPS Knowledge and
subsequent selection of a node. In the beginning, it is presumed that the attacker has knowledge of
components with entry vectors which include N1, N2, N6, and N7. The rule used for node selection
in this case study is random. Applying a probabilistic random selection the attacker selects node
N2 as the first target.
One-step look-ahead action generation
The one-step look-ahead process evaluates the feasibility of each action based on the set of rules for
the attacker model. The rules for this module filter out attacks that do not apply to the node type
or have already been performed on the target node. These rules pass V1, V7, and V8 through the
one-step look-ahead action generation module.
Action Assessment
The action assessment module applies the attack probability functions to the set of Actions V1, V2,
and V8. The probability values for the step, along with intermediate distance and score values, can
be observed in Table 5.7.
Action Sampler
The action sampler then selects one of the vulnerabilities at random in accordance with the proba-
bility of each action. In this case, the sampler selected V8, which is effectively the attack that the
attacker performs.
Feedback
Action V8 has no conditional qualifications for success and therefore results in a successful attack
against node N2. Node N2 is now compromised and all communication paths connected to node
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Figure 5.9 Diagram of attacker CPS knowledge upon completion of the attack, including
attack progression.
N2 are known. In this attacker model, the nodes connected to N2 are considered known as well.
Therefore, information added to the CPS Knowledge model includes the existence of the LAN
communication network, the existence of nodes N3 and N4, and LAN communication relationships
between N1, N2, N3, N4, and N7.
Attack Progression
The attack cycle is repeated until either the target is reached or there are no actions remaining for
the attacker to perform. Figure 5.9 shows the progression of the attack as a POMDP, including
each decision the attacker made in the attacker process and the probability of each decision.
5.4.3 Case Study Findings
The steps taken to complete the attack in Figure 5.9 represent one of many possible attacks that may
have been performed by the attacker. The attacker was able to compromise the CPS by exploiting
three vulnerabilities. Step 1 used an infected USB thumb-drive to gain access to the monitoring
workstation. Step 2 used a MODBUS man-in-the-middle attack to take over the SIS cRIO. Step 3
used a MODBUS DOS attack to disrupt the operation of the BPCS.
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Chapter Six
Integrating the Attacker Model Into
Security Review Process
One of the primary deliverable of this dissertation is the design of a method for integrating the
attacker model perspective into a security review process. In Chapter 3, we identified attacker
behavior analysis shortcomings in security review processes and highlighted the potential value of
integrating attacker models. In Chapter 4 we presented the AMC, which is a standardized way
of describing attacker models, including the input information they require, the output results
they provide, their core operating principles, and the contextual assumptions they make. And in
Chapter 5 we presented the AMFR, which is a standardized way of representing the functional
implementation of attacker models in order to describe at a high-level how an attacker model
leverages input information to ultimately produce results. In this chapter, we present the integration
workflow, which leverages the AMC and AMFR to integrate attacker models into security review
processes.
The integration workflow is a structured process which guides the evaluation of one or more
attacker models for integration with a security review process, identifying the compatibility and
value of each, then guides the integration of a single selected attacker model into the security review
process. The workflow is captured in Figure 6.1 and is divided into two primary parts, first the
evaluation process, and then the integration process.
6.1 Attribute Selection Motivation
Perhaps the most critically motivating factor in the valuation of an AM is the functionality of the AM
and the features it implements. In published literature, attacker models are rarely comprehensive
and usually simplify a significant portion of the modeling process to focus on development of a
particular feature. While we provide insights on the assumptions and implications of the AM
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Figure 6.1 The attacker model integration workflow.
context of application of the SRP and the assumptions made by the SRP. As such, the AMF defines
the value of an AM based upon the definition and requirements of the SRP.
We define the motivating criteria for AM selection as the combination of AM compatibility and
AM value. AM compatibility is driven by the agreement between information requirements of both
the AM and the SRP. This is fully described in Section 6.2.3, but in summary involves the SRP
providing the information required by the AM (system architecture descriptions, attack vectors,
etc...) and the AM providing the results required by the SRP (attack procedures, risk analyses,
etc...). Incompatibility is applied in the AM integration process as a metric for removing AMs from
consideration.
The primary factor that influences AM value is the effort required for integration, which rep-
resents the amount of manual labor required by the security engineer performing the integration
procedure. Attributes that agree between the AM and the SRP are said to have a low labor cost
and therefore a high value. In Section 6.2.3 we define a process for remediation of incompatibilities
through modification of the AM and/or SRP. Attributes requiring remediation may have a higher
labor cost due to the effort involved with modifying the AM and/or the SRP.
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6.2 Evaluation Process
The evaluation process accounts for the first four steps of the workflow. At a high level, the
evaluation process compares the security review process characterization to the attacker model
characterization to evaluate the compatibility between them and the utility that the particular
attacker model provides to the SRP. The three interfaces defined by the AMC (the input, output,
and contextual interfaces) are at the core of this evaluation. The input interface is used to evaluate
if the SRP has available, or can produce, the information that the AM requires to function. The
output interface is used to evaluate if the results produced by the AM are valuable to the SRP.
Finally, the contextual interface is used to evaluate if the contextual assumptions made by the AM
are in agreement with those made by the SRP, as well as to identify neutral assumptions that may
not influence the compatibility but should be considered and documented nonetheless.
The four steps of the evaluation workflow in Figure 6.1 can be summarized as follows. In step
1, the SRPC defined in Section 4.6 is created for the security review process. In step 2, the AMC
is created for each attacker model under consideration for integration. If more than one attacker
model is being evaluated, the AMCs are composed into a database. In step 3, the SRPC is compared
to each AMC to produce compatibility scoring metrics as well as scores that inform how valuable
the AM is to the SRP. Finally, in step 4 the scoring values are used to evaluate the compatibility
of each attacker model and how well each attacker model aligns with the requirements of the SRP.
This process includes an evaluation of incompatibility remediation through modification of the SRP
or AM. Step 4 concludes with the selection of an attacker model for integration. Each of these steps
is described in detail in the following sections.
The evaluation process leverages the information available in the AMC attributes to perform
each step of the evaluation at the highest level of abstraction possible. As the evaluation progresses,
attacker models that are incompatible or provide a low value to the SRP are filtered out, reducing the
number of attacker model integration candidates. As seen in Figure 6.1, as the level of abstraction
decreases - and therefore the amount of detailed analysis required for each attacker model increases -
the number of attacker models decreases as well. This progression of abstraction drastically reduces
the burden of integration by allowing the expert performing the integration to not be required
to perform an in-depth dive to the full set of attacker models, but rather only those which are
compatible and of considerable value to the SRP.
6.2.1 Creating the Security Review Process Characterization
The first step in the integration workflow is to create a description of the security review process
that can be used to compare to the description of the attacker model. The SRPC is described in
Section 4.6 and the creation of the SRPC is done by evaluating each attribute in the three AMC
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interfaces and answering for each the question posited in Section 4.6. A good understanding of the
SRP is required to answer the questions for each of the attributes and it may require additional
effort to answer questions about attributes that the SRP does not explicitly address.
6.2.2 Creating the Attacker Model Characterization
The second step in the integration workflow is to create an AMC (defined in Chapter 4) for each
attacker model in consideration. This results in a pool or database of AMCs that can be evaluated
against the SRPC. While the AMF has considerable value in guiding the evaluation of a single
attacker model, its true value is realized in its ability to easily scale to evaluations of large numbers
of attacker models. The diversity in form and function of different attacker models makes an
objective comparison difficult apart from a foundational characterization of AM attributes. The
AMC serves is an objective description framework which can be used to evaluate and compare
specific attributes of a large number AMs.
This scalability is achieved, in part, by the form of attribute documentation which captures each
attribute as a tuple of a short attribute description and either a boolean indicator or a selection
indicator, where the boolean indicator is false if the attribute is not realized in the AM or true if it
is, the selection indicator is null if the attribute is not realized in the AM or selects from a finite set
of options if it is, and the attribute description is a short explanation of how the attribute is realized
in the AM. The indicator gives the highest-level perspective, readily allowing a high-level review
and comparison of a large number of attributes from multiple attacker models based on attribute
inclusion or exclusion. This can be seen Table 4.2 where the table provides the high-level summary all
attributes in eleven attacker models for all three AMC interfaces. When considering comparisons of
smaller numbers of attributes, the attribute description provides a lower-level perspective, allowing
comparison of the methods employed to realize the attribute.
6.2.3 Evaluating the Attacker Model Characterizations
The third step in the integration workflow is to compare the SRPC to the various AMCs to evaluate
compatibility and identify which AMC provides the most value to the SRP. We identify three
categories of attribute association that are useful in evaluating the compatibility and integration
value of the various attacker models. We then derive scoring functions for each of these attribute
categories. To derive these equations we define the set of attributes in any given interface of the
AMC or SRPC as A, recognizing that the AMC and SRPC will always have identical interface
and attribute composition. For any given interface with n attributes, we define A as the set of all
attributes such that A = {a1, ..., an}.
The first category of attributes we identify are matching attributes, which are those attributes
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which have the same type and description in both the SRPC and the AMC. These attributes indicate
similarities between the SRP and the AM and identify functionality that both have in common.
These attributes are considered positive for integration as they suggest that the AM and the SRP
functionally align and the attribute will not incur a high integration cost. We capture matching
attributes as Am where Am ⊆ A.
We then identify an intermediary value which is the set of interface attributes that do not
match as Ax where Ax ⊆ A and A = Am ∪ Ax. A mismatched attribute is any attribute that is
different between the AMC and the SRPC. The set of mismatched attributes is further partitioned
into mismatched compatible attributes (Acx) and mismatched incompatible attributes (Aix) where
Am = A
i
x ∪ Acx and therefore A = Am ∪ Aix ∪ Acx. For any given attribute, we define compatibility
as the fulfillment of the following condition for each respective interface:
• Input Interface: The information specified by the attribute as being required by the AM is
produced by the SRP.
• Output Interface: The information specified by the attribute as being required by the SRP is
produced from the AM.
• Contextual Interface: The contextual attribute defined by the SRP is realized in the AM.
In effect, attributes that are mismatched may still be compatible if the attribute mismatch results
in a surplus of information and functionality rather than a net deficit. An example of this would be
an AM that provides additional results that are not required by an SRP. Another example would
be an SRP that provides a more detailed system architectural description than is required by the
AM. For the contextual interface, this would take the form of the AM having additional contextual
attributes to those in the SRP. In these instances the presence of extra information and capability
does not hinder the integration, and therefore the compatibility, of the AM and the SRP, but it
does identify fundamental differences between the two. These mismatched compatible attributes,
in effect, represent the assumptions made by the AM and the SRP that do not align but do not
necessarily disqualify the integration.
The final category of attributes, incompatible mismatched attributes, are those attributes which
do not match between the AMC and SRPC, and which indicate information required by the AM from
the SRP or by the SRP from the AM which is not provided. These attributes indicate capabilities
and assumptions of the AM or SRP that depend the form and function of the other and do not




The scoring function for the matching attributes is captured as the match score. The match score
captures the percentage that Am composes of A. That is, the number of matching attributes
relative to the total number of attributes. The purpose of the match score to identify exactly
how well the description of the attacker model aligns with the description of the security review
process by comparing the indicators of each attribute in the AMC and SRPC, identifying a match if
both indicators have the same value else identifying no match. The match score function applies a
positive weighting to each attribute that matches between the SRPC and the AMC, and a negative
(or zero) weight to each attribute that does not match. The match scoring function is applied
to each interface, as well as in summary to all three interfaces. Given the input interface, the
contextual interface, and the output interface, each having l, m, and n attributes respectively,
the set of attributes in each interface is defined as PI, PC, and PO. The attributes for a given
SRPC are defined as PISRP , PCSRP , and POSRP , and the attributes for a given AMC are PIAM ,
PCAM , and POAM . The score for the match match between a given SRPC and an AMC for the
input (SIMatch), contextual (SCMatch), and output (SOMatch) interfaces is a scale of 0-100%.
Attributes are defined as a tuple of a short description and either a boolean indicator or a
selection indicator. The boolean indicator has potential values of TRUE and FALSE, while the
selection indicator can be one of a finite set of options, or FALSE. We define three helper functions
used to evaluate the attributes, each of which are defined as element-wise functions. The first is
the MATCH(, ) function which takes two attributes as input and returns a value of TRUE if both
input attributes match, and a value of FALSE if both input attributes do not match. The second is
the HAS() function which takes one attribute as input and returns a value of TRUE if the attribute
does not equal FALSE. Finally, we define the COUNT () function as a function that returns the
number of attributes in a set. Using these function, we define the match scoring equations for the
input, contextual, and output interface attributes as the following.
SIMatch =












The inclusive scoring function for the input, contextual, and output interfaces are symbolized as
SIInclusive, SCInclusive, and SOInclusive respectively. The inclusive score expands on the matching
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score by not penalizing attacker models where attribute mismatch is a result of a surplus of infor-
mation, rather then a deficit. Formulaically, this is realized differently for each interface because
purpose of the attributes is different between the three interfaces. The inclusive scoring value, in
effect, captures the ratio of the number of attributes in the sets Am and Acx relative to the total
number of attributes in the set A. The inclusive function for the input interface counts as a match
all attributes where the SRPC and AMC attributes are either the same, or where the SRPC has
additional input values that the AMC does not require. This function is captured in Equation 6.4,
SIInclusive =
COUNT (HAS(PISRP ) OR MATCH(PISRP , P IAM ))
l
(6.4)
where OR is the respective boolean function that return a value of TRUE or FALSE.
The inclusive function for the contextual interface counts as a match all attributes in common
between the SRPC and the AMC, as well as all attributes where the AMC has additional contextual
characteristics that are not present in the SRPC. The implication behind this inclusive function is
that, with regards to contextual attributes, the compatibility of an AM is dependent on the AM
agreeing with all the contextual assumptions of an SRP. An AM, however, may bring additional
assumptions that do not contradict those of the SRP, but may be either of utility or of no consequence
to the SRP. The inclusive matching function is represented as MCInclusive and can be seen in
Equation 6.5.
SCInclusive =
COUNT (HAS(PCAM ) OR MATCH(PCSRP , PCAM ))
m
(6.5)
Finally, the inclusive function for the output interface counts as a match all attributes the SRPC
and the AMC have in common, including attributes that are provided by the AMC but not required
by the SRPC. In this function an attacker model is penalized for not providing the results required
by the SRP, but is not penalized for providing additional results that the SRP will not utilize. The
inclusive matching function for the output interface is captured in Equation 6.6.
SOInclusive =
COUNT (HAS(POAM ) OR MATCH(POSRP , POAM ))
n
(6.6)
While the score for the set of matching attributes (Am) is provided directly by the match score, the
score for the set of mismatching compatible (Acx) and mismatching incompatible (Aix) attributes
must be derived. For the set Acx, the score is calculated as the difference between the inclusive
and match scores and applies to all three interfaces as well as to the total scores in the following
section. For the set Aix, the score is calculated as the percentage of attributes not represented by
the inclusive set, which is calculated as the remainder of the inclusive set (100% − ScoreInclusive)
where the function applies to any of the interface scores as well as the total score in the following
section and ScoreInclusive is replaced with the respective interface score. These scores are captured
formulaically as the following:
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Score(Am) = SMatch (6.7)
Score(Acx) = SInclusive − SMatch (6.8)
Score(Aix) = 100%− SInclusive (6.9)
As such, the motivation in applying the attribute scores can be described as follows:
• Am - A high matching score indicates strong similarity between the form and function of the
attacker model and the security review process and is generally considered good.
• Acx - A high compatible mismatched score indicates that an attacker model is different in form
and function from the security review process (this has no bearing on compatibility).
• Aix - A high incompatibility score indicates that the attacker model has significant attribute
mismatch that inhibits its compatibility with a security review process and is considered bad.
Total Scoring Functions
The total match score and total inclusive score, SMatch and SInclusive respectively, can be calculated
as the average of the matching values for the three interfaces using Equation 6.10 and Equation 6.11
respectively.
SMatch =








In order to preserve the utility and objectivity of the scoring functions, we do not include attribute
weightings, but rather evaluate attribute preference later in the workflow. The scoring function
are leveraged in the integration workflow as an objective indicator of attribute similarity between
attacker models and the SRP, and they are leveraged so as to guide the security expert through
the attacker model selection process. During the AM Evaluation and Selection process in Step
4 of the integration workflow, after performing compatibility evaluation, the expert is given the
opportunity to apply preference to different attributes to inform the selection of a final attacker
model for integration.
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6.2.4 Attacker Model Selection Process
The attacker model selection step as seen in Figure 6.1 is a three-step process which involves first
filtering out incompatible AMs, secondly filtering out AMs that have low value, and finally selecting
an AM for integration from the remaining pool.
Filtering Incompatible AMs
Attribute incompatibility is caused by attributes in the set Aix and increases as the number of
incompatible attributes increase. The first step for attacker model selection is to use the score for
Aix to identify and filter our incompatible attacker models. A score of 0% implies that an AM has
no incompatibility with the SRP, while an inclusive score of 100% implies that the AM is completely
incompatible with the SRP.
A low inclusive score greater than 0% implies only minor incompatibility, which may prompt
further investigation on the part of the security engineer performing the integration. In these in-
stances, it may be possible to improve compatibility between the SRP and the AM by considering
modification of the AM, the SRP, or both. In these instances, a security engineer evaluates the
inclusive matches of the Input, Contextual, and Output interfaces to identify the mismatched at-
tribute(s) and evaluate potential resolution. In the case of the input attribute mismatch, this will
require modifying the SRP to make the input information available, or modifying the AM to make
the model no longer dependent on that input information. In the case of contextual attribute
mismatch, the disagreeing contextual aspects may be removed from the SRP, or the AM may be
expanded to account for those contextual aspects. Finally, in the case of output attribute mismatch,
the SRP may be modified to not require the mismatched output, or the AM may be evolved to
provide the missing output information.
In conclusion, AMs with a 0% score for the incompatible mismatched attribute category (Aix)
are considered fully compatible and pass the incompatibility filtering step. AMs with a <100% score
must be justified by the engineer and pass the filtering step if remediation of the incompatibility
can be justified. AMs with a <100% score that cannot be justified are excluded from consideration
for the remainder of the evaluation process. We formally capture this in the following equations.
Filtering AMs by Similarity
Once incompatible AMs have been removed, the remaining pool of AMs must be evaluated to
identify which is the best match for the security review process. While this process may require more
in-depth evaluation of the various attacker models, the scores for the set of mismatched compatible
attributes (Acx) aid by providing significant context to the integration expert. The score for Acx is a
measure of the number of attributes that do not cause incompatibility, but are either provided by
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the SRPC and unused by the AMC or are provided by the AMC and unused by the SRPC. When
evaluating AM integration apart from a structured workflow, attributes that enable compatibility
or inhibit compatibility such as those in Am and Aix are easier to identify as resolution of those
attributes is a functional prerequisite to integration. This scoring method is uniquely valuable as
attributes in the set Acx are difficulty to identify and often constitute those assumptions made by the
AM or the SRP that go unnoticed because they do not inhibit compatibility. This scoring function
provides an objective method for identifying those attributes, and therefore the assumptions made
by those attributes.
Selecting an AM for integration
Evaluating the merit of an AM for integration with an SRP based on individual attributes repre-
sents a significant manual effort. The effect of the previous two filtering steps reduces the burden
of effort significantly by eliminating both incompatible and low value AMs from consideration. The
remaining AMs, then, undergo a more critical evaluation, where the integration expert evaluates
the descriptions of the input, contextual, and output interface attributes, in order to select a single
attacker model for integration. If at this stage multiple high-quality attacker models are available
that fulfill the requirements of the SRP, then the reviewing expert should perform in-depth evalua-
tion using the attribute descriptions as a reference, and exploring the available literature provided
by the authors in order to select a single attacker model for integration.
6.3 Integration Process
Once an attacker model has been selected for integration through the evaluation process, the second
part of the workflow focuses on integrating the selected Attacker Model into the SRP. The integration
process as seen in Figure 6.1 is a three-step process. In step 5 the AMFR is created for the attacker
model. Step 6 characterizes the data provided by and consumed by the SRP. In step 7 the interfaces
between the SRPC and the AMC are mapped and the attacker model is integrated into the security
review process.
6.3.1 Attacker Model Functional Representation Creation
The AMFR is defined in Chapter 5 and the creation process is demonstrated in the case study which
develops the AMFR for Deloglos’ AM. This step involves the creation of the full AMFR, including the
definition of all modules, variables, constants, relationships, and the rules implemented in the various
modules, variables, and relationships. In addition to describing the functional implementation of
the AM, the AMFR aids the integration by capturing the functional edges of the AM, identifying
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where and how information is provided to the AM and where the AM produces results.
6.3.2 Security Review Process Data Mapping
Once the AMFR is created for the AM, it is necessary to identify how data is transferred between
the SRP and the AM. The AMFR captures the information required as input to the attacker model
from the security review process as input constants. The first part of this step is to identify the
source of data from the SRP for each constant of the AMFR. The SRP input data is captured as a
tuple of the ID of the AMFR constant the data is provided for, a description of the source of the
data in the SRP, and a description of the form of the data being provided.
The AMFR captures the output information provided in conclusion of the attacker model execu-
tion to the security review process as a variable. This output data required by the SRP is captured
as a tuple of the ID of the AMFR variable the data is provided from, a description of the destination
the data is provided to in the SRP, and a description of the form of that the data is being provided
in.
6.4 Integration Workflow Conclusion
The conclusion of the integration workflow is a tabulated document identifying the description,
form, function, source, and destination of 1) the data that must be provided to the attacker model
from the security review process and 2) the data that must be produced from the attacker model
to the security review process as the results of the attacker model execution.
The expected next step of applying the now-integrated AM and SRP is to execute the security
review process. While the execution steps for every security review process will be unique to that
particular review process, practically speaking, this can generally be described as the following
steps:
1. Execute the security review process to the point where all data required for the attacker model
to execute is available.
2. Extract the information specified in the integration documentation from the security review
process and provide it to the documented destinations in the attacker model.
3. Execute the attacker model to completion using the data provided from the security review
process.
4. Capture the attacker model results results specified in the integration documentation and
provide them to the documented destinations in the security review process.
5. Complete the security review process.
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Chapter Seven
Case Study - EPRI’s Technical
Assesment Methodology
In Chapters 4 and 5 we described the two modules of our attacker modeling framework. In Chapter 6,
we described our structured process for integrating attacker models into security review processes
using our attacker modeling framework. In order to demonstrate the utility of the attacker modeling
framework and the integration workflow, we perform the following integration use case, which
explores the integration of an attacker model with the Technical Assessment Methodology (TAM) [1]
developed by the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI).
7.1 TAM Summary
EPRI’s Technical Assessment Methodology is a structured security review process used for cyber-
and cyber-physical systems. The purpose of the TAM is to facilitate the identification and selection
of engineered security control methods and exploit sequence mitigation techniques by character-
izing attack surfaces and exploit mechanisms in a CPS. The TAM is part of a larger workflow
and integrates into several other EPRI products including EPRI’s DRAM (a tool for capturing a
comprehensive system description) and EPRI’s HAZCAD (a tool for system hazard analysis).
The process of attacker model integration begins by identifying a need for an attacker model,
which is often discovered by observing where in the security assessment process the behavior of the
attacker is assumed. The workflow of the TAM is partitioned into three primary steps. First, the en-
gineers performing the security review characterize the attack surface and identify exploit sequences.
Second, the engineers identify security control methods, which are scored and allocated. Finally,
several mitigation and normalization techniques are used to handle residual exploit sequences.
In step one, the characterization of the attack surface is a guided process where engineers follow
a guiding workflow to evaluate a system architecture and establish the assessment scope, the asset
characteristics, and the attack pathways, which are used to define composite exploit sequences. The
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attack pathways are identified via a manual effort of observing relationships between components,
often using a system diagram, and tracking how different communication protocols relate different
physical interfaces. The engineer then applies the attack paths in the context of a finite set of
attack scenarios to intuit exploit sequences. The effectiveness of TAM is contingent on the engineer
effectively identifying all exploit sequences, as TAM does not claim any assurance for unknown
exploit sequences.
A lack of scalability can be a significant limitation in a security review process as the manual
effort for completing an SRP can become unrealistic when considered in the scope of a full system
architecture. The workflow of the TAM is designed with scalability in mind and aids engineers by
decomposing the full assessment process into many smaller steps, each evaluating a narrower scope
of the system architecture. While this organizes the assessment process and makes the effort to
complete the TAM manageable, the development of exploit sequences still represents a significant
manual effort. Attacker models may present a solution to reduce the amount of effort required for
AM composition and further improve the scalability of the TAM. It is desirable to offload as much
of the exploit sequence composition as possible to the AM.
7.2 Step 1 - SRPC Creation
Step one in the integration process is the creation of the Security Review Process Characterization.
This includes evaluation of the various attributes in the three interfaces in accordance with the
process in Section 4.6.
7.2.1 Output Interface
We begin by evaluating the output interface to identify what attacker model results may be of
use to the TAM. The output interface identifies 5 results, which are Procedures, Security Metrics,
Security Properties, Outcome Likelihood, and Risk Assessment. In order to evaluate these, we ask
the question, "Do we want the AM to provide these results for the SRP. Considering the integration
goal of automating exploit sequence generation, the generation of attack procedures will identify
the exploit sequence, and therefore the Procedure result is desirable. We document the Procedure
attribute as the tuple {true, Desire the generation of all possible attack exploit sequences}. The




For the input interface, the SRPC identifies all the information available from the SRP that can
be provided to the attacker model. This not only requires an understanding of the TAM, but
also requires the expected contribution of the AM to be bounded. It was stated at the beginning
of the integration that the ideal goal of integrating an attacker model is to automate as much
of the exploit sequence generation as possible. The amount of information available in the SRP
increases as the exploit sequence generation process progresses. For example, the TAM separates
the identification of attack pathways and the composition of exploit sequences into two subsequent
steps, both included in the attack sequences generation process. Bounding the role of the attacker
model to only the second step means that attack pathways generation will be a preliminary step
and attack pathways can be provided to the attacker model as input. Bounding the role of the AM
to the whole attacker model generation process, means that the AM will be responsible for both
attack pathway generation and exploit sequence generation. Therefore, it is important to bound
the expected role and function of the AM before defining the various interfaces.
In this use case, the motivation of automating as much of the attack sequence generation pro-
cess as possible motivates the AM bounding decision to include attack pathway generation in the
expected function of the AM. System component descriptions are captured in the TAM as Cyber
Security Data Sheets and component relationships are captured in the form of Relationship Set Data
Sheets. System protocols, process properties, and performance metrics are not formal components
of the TAM and are not provided to the AM.
In terms of attack vectors, the TAM workflow expects manual identification of vulnerabilities
associated with each component. While this process could be delegated to the attacker model,
the vast majority of attacker models do not undertake vulnerability identification and discovery,
but rather leave that to engineers to provide using more specialized techniques. For the TAM
integration we delegate the vulnerability discovery process to the security engineers, and expect as
input to the attacker model a vulnerability database composed with CPS component associations.
The TAM assessment includes a component-driven vulnerability evaluation. As such, it is expected
that vulnerabilities will be associated to specific CPS components and so the assumption of security
experts performing the vulnerability analysis is reasonable. The TAM does not explicitly consider
different types of attackers, and therefore there are no vulnerability associations to the attacker.
Finally, in regards to attacker definition, the TAM does not consider unique attackers. As such,
the entire branch of attacker attributes including Profile-Defined Attacker, Profile Specificity, and
Model-Defined Attacker are set to false.
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7.2.3 Contextual Interface
The contextual interface is characterized for the SRPC by evaluating each of the attributes and
identifying if the SRP recognizes the concept of each attribute as being valid. The TAM begins
by first defining the system architecture, then associating vulnerabilities to components in the
architecture and using component relationships to associate vulnerabilities together to compose
exploit sequences. This corresponds to the system component principle perspective. The objective
is described for the TAM in the context of the SRP/AM integration. We capture this as, "Leverages
an attacker model to generate exploit sequences".
Time is the first evaluated attribute in the physics attribute category. While the TAM includes
the concept of time in later steps of the tool workflow (such as in evaluating exploit sequence
criticality), it does not include any standardized time-based characterization of the components,
the component relationships, or component processes. Next, the TAM does not have any process
that specifically applies unpredictable behaviors to the review process. In order to functionally
integrate into a security review process, an attacker model must be executable, else the security
experts will need to devise a method to functionally execute the attacker model. For this case study,
we assume that the security experts are only interested in attacker models that are executable. With
regards to the operational method, the TAM treats exploit sequences as a composition of sequential
actions performed by the attacker.
Next, the Attacker/CPS Interaction attribute category is evaluated first considering the Attack
Procedure. The TAM does not have a mechanism for evaluating the success or failure of an attack.
The workflow is intended to identify the existence of a potential attack path, effectively charac-
terising attack steps as possible or impossible. Therefore, the attack procedure is set to {false,}.
The TAM does not consider attack consequences in the exploit sequence generation process and
therefore it is set to false as well. The TAM workflow is centered, however, around determining
CPS Security Controls. In the TAM workflow, the step following exploit sequence generation in-
cludes control method development, which includes consideration of both intrusion detection and
countermeasures. Whether or not to include these in the SRPC depends on the bounds set for the
role of the AM. Because the scope of the attacker model integration for the TAM was exclusively
set to exploit sequence generation, the development of control methods falls outside the scope of
the attacker model and therefore the CPS Security Controls attribute and its child attributes are
set to false.
The CPS behavior attribute category is the next category evaluated for the contextual interface.
The TAM does not explicitly consider CPS Security Protocols. While the TAM does define the
communication channels (communication types), it does not actually define the communications
that are sent between components. The TAM does not model a functioning system and therefore
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does not maintain a security state but rather considers a system component insecure if an attack
pathway exists for that component. Because the TAM does not model system processes and it
does not maintain a CPS Process state, nor does it model cyber-processes or physical processes.
The TAM does, however, maintain both a cyber orientation and a physical orientation through
documentation of the CPS under review.
Finally, the attacker behavior category is evaluated. The TAM does not specify an attacker but
presumes exploit sequences be created for all possible attackers. It also includes an insider as a valid
attacker, and for the exploit sequence generation step does not restrict the information available
to the insider. Therefore, the exploit sequence generation process presumes the attacker have full
awareness of the system architecture, which corresponds with the static attacker knowledge model.
The summary of the attribute results can be seen in Table 7.1.
7.3 Step 2 - AMC Database Population
The attacker modeling framework is dependent on the existence of, or ability to create, a database
of attacker models, each described with an AMC. For the TAM case study, we use the AMCs for
the attacker models evaluated in Chapter 4 which can be seen summarized in Table 4.2 and fully
documented in Appendix A. These attacker models were selected because they represent a wide
diversity of attacker models in form, function, and assumptions.
7.4 Step 3 - AMC Evaluation
Evaluation of the attacker model database with respect to the SRPC is done via application of the
scoring functions defined in Section 6.2.4. The calculated scoring values are presented in Table 7.2.
For each scoring category, the average value was calculated and results above the average value were
highlighted as green while results below the average value were highlighted as red. The intermediary
matching evaluations for each attribute in each interface can be seen in Appendix C as Tables C.1
and C.2.
7.5 Step 4 - Attacker Model Selection
The AM selection process follows the process described in Section 6.2.4, beginning with compatibility
filtering.
91
Table 7.1 The security review process characterization for the use-case application of
EPRI’s Technical Assessment Methodology [1]
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Table 7.2 Scoring values calculated from the comparison of the AMC and SRPC attributes
for the TAM use case, highlighting above average values as green, below average values as
red, and average values as yellow
7.5.1 Filtering by Incompatibility
First, the score for incompatible attributes (Aix) defined in Equation 6.9 is used to filter out in-
compatible attacker models. In order to be compatible an attacker model must either meet an
incompatibility score of 0%, or else the expert performing the review must be able to justify each
mismatched attribute of the attacker model. While several of the attacker models achieved very high
inclusive matching scores, none of them scored 0% and therefore each requires consideration and
justification of the conflicting attributes. We evaluate the attacker models in order of highest-scoring
inclusive total match to lowest.
Teixeira’s AM in [63] achieved a score of 8.5% with 3 incompatible attributes. The first is the
operational method which is sequential for the SRP but discrete-time based for the AM. This is
more critical in SRPs where the review process depends on intermediary values in the attacker
modeling process. In the TAM case study, the deliverable of generating exploit sequences does not
require a particular operating method, so long as the AM can capture those exploit sequences and
provide them as output. For the second attribute, the AM requires as input process properties
for the system architecture, which are not explicitly defined in the TAM. Inspecting the AM, the
process properties expected include control actions, sensor measurements, process and measurement
noise, and measurements of the discrepancies between the model and the real process. Remediation
of this attribute would require the engineers develop or acquire these process properties for the
system under evaluation. While this may be possible for certain systems, it would be a labor-
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intensive process and would conflict with the integration goal of reducing the effort required by the
security review experts. Therefore, this attribute cannot be justified and Teixeira’s AM removed
from consideration.
Monteuuis’ AM in [56] achieved a score of 8.9% with 4 incompatible attributes. The first is the
principle perspective which is the component perspective for the SRP but is the individual attack
perspective for the AM. AMs developed from the individual attack perspective are created around
an integral use case and may be valuable to an independent use case if the AM can be modified
sufficiently to apply to the new use case. Evaluating Monteuuis’ attacker model, the model was
designed around the perspective of attackers against connected and automated vehicles. Built on
this foundation, the relationship between the attacker and the system is explicitly derived around the
architecture of autonomous vehicles and does not translate to other system architectures. Therefore,
while Monteuuis’ AM may work for TAM if the architecture under review is an autonomous vehicle,
it does not work as a generic solution.
Vigo’s AM in [73] achieved an incompatibility score of 10.4%, with 5 incompatible attributes.
The first two are Uses Profiling and Profile Specificity. These attributes are incompatible because
the AM requires as input profiles of expected attackers, whereas the TAM does not explicitly define
attacker profiles. Remediation of this is possible if the expert performing the integration adds a
step to the TAM where an engineer identifies profiles for various attackers according to the profiling
scheme in the AM. While this would require additional work on the part of the security expert, the
TAM assumes the export is manually evaluating the range of potential threats in the process of
creating exploit sequences, and so it a reasonable assumption. The third attribute is the attacker
knowledge model which is static for the SRP but dynamic for Vigo’s AM. This can be resolved
if the engineer defines the initial knowledge expectation of the attacker, which could be set to a
complete initial knowledge for this attribute to have no effect. The final attribute is the executable
attribute. While Vigo presents a well-formulated attacker model, it cannot readily be applied to
simulate attacker behavior without being executable and is therefore not compatible with the SRP.
Mo’s AM in [72] achieved a score of 12.2% with 5 incompatible attributes. The first is the
principle perspective which is also the individual attack perspective. Mo’s attacker model is designed
around smart power grid infrastructure and, similar to Moneuuis’, is uniquely designed around the
architectural characteristics of power-grids and cannot readily be applied to a generic security review.
Le May’s AM in [54] also achieved a score of 12.2% with 5 incompatible attributes. The principle
perspective of Le May’s attacker model is the vulnerability perspective, in contrast to the system
component perspective used in the TAM. Attacker models that use the vulnerability perspective
begin with an association of vulnerabilities within the system and then relate those vulnerabilities to
components and to the attacker. This vulnerability association can take many forms, but is realized
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as the exploit sequence in TAM or as an attack execution graph in Le May’s model. This is an
inverse workflow of that presented by TAM where the system architecture is first defined including
relationships between components, then vulnerabilities are associated to components to produce
exploit sequences. Therefore, Le May’s AM is fundamentally incompatible with the requirements
of the TAM use case.
Deloglos’ AM in [5] achieved a score of 13.7% with 5 incompatible attributes. The first is the
physical orientation attribute which is true in the TAM but not in Deloglos’ AM. While the system
architectural description provided as input to the TAM captures the physical orientation of the
system and exploit sequences take into account how physical orientation influences different attack
vectors. Deloglos’ AM does not explicitly model physical orientation, but rather requires as input
a list of all vulnerabilities of the system, which is expected to take into account vulnerabilities
relating to physical orientation. Because the TAM workflow requires discover of all attack paths as
a prerequisite step to exploit sequence generation, it is not unreasonable to expect the experts to
provide the same list in the form of vulnerabilities to the AM. Therefore this attribute mismatch is
acceptable. The TAM defines the Attacker Knowledge Model as static assuming that the attacker
may have knowledge of the system architecture and the system details, whereas Deloglos’ AMmodels
a dynamic attacker knowledge model. In this instance, either a step can be added to the TAM to
define the initial attacker knowledge, or the initial attacker knowledge can be set to knowledge of the
complete system. The remaining three mismatched attributes in Deloglos’ AM are Uses Profiling,
Profile Specificity, and Attacker Associations. Deloglos uses a profiling-based attacker model which
requires as input attacker profiles as well as a similar characteristics for each attack action, and then
associates the attacker profiles to action characteristics to predict attacks. This could be mediated
by adding a step to the TAM where an attacker profile is defined as input for the AM.
McEvoy’s AM in [62] achieved a score of 15.2% with 5 incompatible attributes. McEvoy’s AM
leverages a variant of pi-Calculus to develop a system-theoretic model of a SCADA system. One
of the incompatible attributes is the Process Properties attribute. In order to model the SCADA
system McEvoy’s AM requires descriptions of SCADA supervisor, control, and communication pro-
cesses. This level of process detail is beyond the requirements of the AM and cannot necessarily be
produced or acquired by the experts performing the SRP. Therefore, McEvoy’s AM is not compat-
ible.
Adepu’s AM in [57] achieved a score of 17.0% with 6 incompatible attributes. Adepu’s AM is a
generalized attacker and attack model for modeling a diverse set of systems and a diverse variety of
attacks and attackers. Adepu’s model, however, models the system and the attacker to a significant
level of detail, requiring both process properties and system performance metrics as inputs, both of
which are not explicitly defined in the TAM, and unrealistic to expect the security review experts
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to produce without a significant effort. Therefore, Adepu’s AM is not a viable AM solution for the
TAM.
Orojloo’s AM in [55] achieved a score of 17.0% with 6 incompatible attributes. Orojloo’s AM,
much like Adepu’s, requires a process model of the system under review. Because the detail required
for composing a process model is not available in the TAM, the AM is not compatible.
Ekelhart’s AM in [59] achieved a score of 15.6% with 6 incompatible attributes. Ekelhart’s AM
use a vulnerability perspective as its principle perspective, taking as input a series of vulnerabilities
defined with execution preconditions and post-conditions, as well as an attacker model, and compiles
an abstract attack graph. The attack graph is then associated to a system model in order to
determine attack procedures. The requirement of vulnerabilities is reasonable given that the TAM
requires the population of attack pathways which can be translated to a list of vulnerabilities.
The preconditions and post-conditions can be manually created by security experts with minimal
additional effort given the simplistic design of Ekelhart’s condition scheme. In addition, the creation
of the attacker profile is a low-effort requirements which is reasonable for the security experts to
produce. The attacker knowledge model is the last conflicting attribute. Ekelhart’s AM implements
a dynamic attacker knowledge model where attack steps are only visible to an attacker when all
preceding attack steps are accomplished. This characteristic of the model is self-contained and does
not require additional AM input and therefore is acceptable to the SRP.
Finally, Basin’s AM in [74] achieved a score of 22.2% with 7 incompatible attributes. Basin’s
model uses system-theoretic operational semantics to develop system protocols. Basin’s model does
not provide attack procedures and is therefore incompatible with the requirements of the SRP.
In conclusion to the filtering step, we identified that two attacker models are compatible with
the TAM, which are Deloglos’, and Ekelhart’s attacker models with incompatibility scores of 13.7%
and 15.6% respectively. Resolutions were identified for each incompatibility, requiring modification
of the AM or the SRP, or both. The magnitude of effort required for attribute compatibility is the
first contributor to the AM valuation. Vigo’s AM requires the least effort, requiring the TAM to
be extended to define attacker profiles. Deloglos’ AM likewise requires the TAM to be extended
to define attacker profiles. Deloglos’ AM also requires the as input a list of vulnerabilities, which
can be provided from the list of attack paths developed in the TAM. Ekelhart’s AM requires the
definition of an attacker profile by the TAM, as well as a list of vulnerabilities, but requires the
engineer performing the TAM to develop preconditions and post-conditions for all vulnerabilities.
7.5.2 Evaluating Assumptions
Once incompatible attacker models have been filtered out, the compatible mismatched attributes
(Acx) of the remaining attacker models are evaluated in order to identify which attacker model pro-
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vides the most value to the SRP using Equation 6.8 . The remaining pool of attacker models under
consideration includes those created by Deloglos and Ekelhart which have compatible mismatched
attribute scores of 15.9% and 17.8% respectively, which indicate what percentage of the attributes
that are mismatched do not inhibit compatibility.
Deloglos’ AM includes in the set Acx the attributes Unpredictability, Attack Procedure, CPS
Communication, CPS Process State, CPS Security State, and Outcome Likelihood. The unpre-
dictability in Deloglos’ AM is applied by creating a non-deterministic attacker profile, which results
in a non-deterministic attack procedure. Deloglos’ AM can be leveraged to identify different attack
paths by repeatedly executing the AM and collecting the results of different exploit sequences. An
attack procedure is not specified in the TAM but rather left to the security expert to intuit. As
such, we note that Deloglos’ AM uses a qualification-based AM. The information necessary to qual-
ify attack success is provided through the CPS Associations and Attacker Associations attributes
which were resolved in the compatibility filtering step by having the SRP expert define profiles
for the attacker and each attack path. CPS Communication is realized in Deloglos’ AM much like
in Vigo’s, where communication relationships between components including communication types
(MODUBS, Ethernet, etc...) are expected as part of the system architecture. The CPS Process
State and CPS Security State are not reasoned about by the TAM and are used as internal mecha-
nisms in the AM to execute the attacker model. The outcome likelihood is an additional value that
Deloglos’ AM provides, which includes the probability of an exploit sequence being used given the
range of attacker profiles.
Ekelhart’s AM includes in the set Acx the attributes Attack Procedure, Attack Consequence,
CPS Security Controls, Intrusion Detection Countermeasures, CPS Process State, CPS Security
State, and Outcome Likelihood. Ekelhart’s AM uses a qualification-based Attack Procedure sim-
ilarly to Deloglos’ and Vigo’s AMs which is internal to the AM. The model also evaluates attack
consequences using confidentiality metrics provided to the system. The confidentiality is associated
with attack vectors and is expected to be provided as a property for each attack vector that affects
confidentiality. Ekelhart’s AM models the effect of CPS Security Controls as Intrusion Detection
and Countermeasures in the system. The purpose of the TAM is to use the exploit sequences to
develop security controls and therefore at the step where the TAM provides information to the AM,
security controls do not yet exist. However, Ekelhart’s AM is capable of modeling the attack in the
absence of security controls which is a viable solution for the TAM integration. The CPS Process
State and CPS Security State are similarly attributes that the TAM does not consider. Finally,
Ekelhart’s AM provides as a result Outcome Likelihood which includes statistics such as if the target
was reached, attack duration, total actions, and confidentiality impact.
Both AM’s are compatible with the TAM, are of high value to the TAM, and produce the exploit
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sequences required by the TAM. While Ekelhart’s AM has more features, its simulation engine
executes the attacker model at a lower interaction level, which requires the definition of detailed
properties for the component descriptions, such as installed software, firmware, patches, and other
vulnerability-related properties. The manual exploit sequence generation process advised by the
TAM is modeled as a higher-level process which does not necessarily consider the more detailed
properties of Ekelhart’s AM. This is more in-line with the higher-level perspective of Deloglos’
AM which uses more generic properties for characterize vulnerability. Therefore, Deloglos’ AM is
selected for the integration.
7.6 Step 5 - Attacker Model Functional Representation Creation
The first step in the integration process is the creation of the AMFR for Deloglos’ AM. The full
AMFR development process for Deloglos’ AM can be observed Section 5.3. A complete listing of the
AMFR is captured as a table of the modules, variables, constants, and relationships of the AMFR
and can be seen in Table B.2 of Appendix B. In addition, the AMFR diagram can be observed in
Appendix B in Figure B.2.
7.7 Step 6 - Data Integration Mapping
The AMFR for Deloglos’ AM defines four constants of input information, all of which are expected
to be provided by the security review process. These constants include the CPS Architecture, the
Attacker Initial Knowledge, the Action Database, and the Probabilistic Attacker Profile. For each
of these constants we document the mapping of the data provided from the SRP.
The CPS Architecture constant of the AMFR is described as the set of all nodes and edges in
the CPS. This is captured captured in the TAM through part 1 of step 1 of the creation of the Cyber
Security Data Sheet (CSDS), which can be seen in Figure 7.3. The CSDS requires the creation of
the Assessment Scope in Part 1a and the Asset Characteristics in Part 1b. Part of the assessment
scope includes the Asset Composition, the Asset Decomposition, and the Installed Configuration
and Data Flow. The TAM emphasizes the importance of identifying the bounds of an asset de-
scription in attack surface characterization. The asset composition identifies what is included in the
asset, including the description of all components and sub-components. Asset decomposition is the
process of identifying and documenting the sub-components of the asset. In the TAM, part of the
documentation of asset composition and decomposition includes general component descriptions,
sub-component descriptions, a list of component and sub-component manuals and documentation,
and device model numbers. The installed configuration and data flow in the asset composition cap-
tures the relationship between the different components based on the set of a dataflow diagram and
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Table 7.3 Organization and work products from Part 1 of Step 1 of the Cyber Security
Data Sheet from EPRI’s TAM. Table taken from [1]
.
a data topology and data flow description. Step 1b of the TAM captures the Asset Characteristics,
which includes component data such as firmware, operating systems, installed application software,
installed configurations, maintenance methods, and site characteristics which include physical and
logical component orientation.
The AMFR identifies the required data for the CPS architecture as a set of nodes, each containing
an ID, Name, and Type, and a set of edges, each containing an ID, Name, a Source, a Destination,
and a Type. For the node, the data maps from the output of the SRP to the input of the AM as
follows. The CPS ID and Name are provided by the list of items in the TAM asset decomposition.
The node Type is defined by Deloglos’ AM as the attribute used to associate attack vectors to
nodes. The type can be populated as any attribute that the engineer designing the dataset of
attack actions can used to associate attack actions to nodes. This includes physical interfaces and
firmware, operating systems, installed application software, installed configurations, maintenance
methods, and site characteristics. This mapping can be seen in Table C.3 in Appendix C.
The Asset Characteristics of the TAM also include edge-related information such as physical
communication ports and terminals, removable media and portable devices, HMI capabilities, data
communication protocols, and services and logical communication ports. This effectively maps to
the edge descriptions required by Deloglos’ AMFR. The AMFR edge ID, Name, and Type maps
from the TAM identifier of the respective edge-related target asset characteristic. This can be seen
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documented in Table C.3.
In the AMC compatibility filtering part of Step 4, the resolution for the AM requirement of a
database of vulnerabilities was to modify the TAM to produce this database. The TAM provides
a subset of vulnerabilities by identifying the points on the attack surface where an attack could
originate, documenting these as attack vectors. Attack vectors are then used to reason out attack
paths. Creation of an action database would require an intermediary step where a vulnerability
assessment process is performed on all components of the asset decomposition, as well as on all
communications-related asset characteristics. This would provide the action ID, Name, and Target
data. The concept of action profile properties used in the AM to associate the attacker to actions
does not exist in the TAM. This incompatibility was resolved in Step 4 by modifying the TAM
to include a step where the security expert creates for each action in the database a profile in
accordance with the profile properties selected in the pre-configuration of the attacker model. This
mapping can be seen in Table C.3.
The final constant of the AMFR is the probabilistic attacker profile which is composed of three
components: pre-configuration properties for the AM profiling scheme, the set of profile properties
for each of the six attacker types, and the likelihood of attack of each of the attacker types. Attacker
profiles are not a native concept to the TAM and in the compatibility evaluation in Step 4 this was
resolved by modifying the TAM to include a step that creates this data according to the format
described in Deloglos’ AM. This mapping can be seen in Table C.3.
Through this mapping process, we were able to provide descriptions of the data source for all
input data required by the AM from the SRP. The next step is to map how the output results
from the AM are returned to the SRP. The results of the AM are documented as the attack path
taken by the attacker informed by probabilities for target selection and action selection. The exploit
sequence for the TAM is defined as the set of the exploit objective, the attack pathway, and the
exploit mechanism. The attack paths from Deloglos’ AM are map to the attack paths of the TAM
exploit sequence. The vulnerabilities exploited map to the TAM exploit mechanism.
The AMF leverages a high-level description of the attacker model to facilitate an evaluation and
integration process without requiring an in-depth dive into the meticulous inner workings of attacker
models. A limitation of this workflow is that during integration, different data formats may require
additional work in effectively mapping low-level information. This is observed when integrating the
third component of the TAM’s exploit sequence, which is the exploit objective. In the SRPC, the
exploit objective was identified as a result requirement by the TAM. In the AMC, Deloglos’ AM
was identified as providing attack procedures which included the exploit objective. Deloglos’ AM
captures the exploit objective as ending target node in the attack procedure. The TAM, however,
has a more specific definition for exploit objectives, which is a set of 28 distinct exploit objectives
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which identify the all possible goals of the attack. Integration of the exploit objective will require
a translation of the exploit objective from Deloglos’ AM to the proper selection of the exploit
objectives defined by the TAM. We capture this in the integration documentation in Table C.4.
7.8 Step 7 - AM Integration
To verify the integration of Deloglos’ AM into the TAM, we evaluate the execution of the integrated
pair at the boundaries of integration. The component mapping from the TAM to Deloglos’ AM
can be seen in Table 7.4, and the mapping from Deloglos’ AM back to the TAM can be seen in
Table 7.5. The first table identifies the data that the TAM is expected to provide to the attacker
model. The second identifies the data that the AM is expected to provide back to the TAM. The
condition we set for validating the integration is that all fields of data in 7.4 and 7.5 map correctly.
The TAM workflow implements a tabulated documentation scheme which can be seen in Tables D.1-
D.6. In order to verify the mapping, we expand Table 7.4 to contain a data field for each mapping
relationship. We then extract the data from the source listed in the table and document it in the
respective location.
The first datum is the mapping of system component node ID and Name information from the
Asset Decomposition Description ID in Part 1a, which can be seen in Table D.2. The documentation
describes the level of decomposition as being down to the circuit board level, where the individual
components can be seen in the data flow diagram in Table D.3. The data flow diagram defines the
names of the components but not the IDs. The expert performing the integration may decide what
amount of format manipulation is acceptable when transposing the data from the SRP to the AM. In
this instance, the lacking of ID values are not a significant issue as the TAM recognizes components
by name, and we can manually define IDs in the data transfer process. For the validation datum,
we document the RAM on the simplified loop controller as the first component, define the ID as
NODE1, and document it as {RAM,NODE1} in Table 7.4.
There are several asset characteristics to choose from for the node Type. The Type datum is
used in the AM to associate vulnerabilities and attack actions to components. For the validation
data, we select the Firmware version of the SRL controller, "Firmware Version 2.1". Next is the
Edge component with the set of Name, ID, and Type. In the Physical Communication Ports and
Terminals section of Table D.6 we see that there are three communication paths to the RAM, which
are the Analog Input, Analog Output, and JTAG PINS. For a validation Edge, we select the Analog
Inputs. This is defined with several characteristics that may be used for vulnerability association,
such as the protocol type and version, which is HART Version 7. We then document this datum as
{"Analog Input","EDGE1","HART Version 7"}. We use the Data Topology and Data Flow section
from Table D.3 to identify the Edge source and destination. In the diagram, the analog input source
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Figure 7.1 An example of a Data Flow Diagram for a simplified single loop controller.
Image taken from EPRI’s TAM report [1].
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Table 7.4 Integration mapping of attacker model input data from the TAM in [1] to
Deloglos’ attacker model in [5] with validation data
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Table 7.5 Integration mapping of AM output results from Deloglos’ AM in [5] to the TAM
in [1] with validation data
comes from the component labeled "PT." Assuming the PT to have an ID of "Node2", we define the
Edge source and destination datum as {"Node2", "Node1"}. In Table 7.4, C3 represents the initial
knowledge known by the attacker. In the compatibility resolution step in Chapter 7 we justified the
resolution as providing the full CPS architecture as the attacker’s initial knowledge since the TAM
does not have the assumption of a growing attacker knowledge.
The next AMFR component is C3, the vulnerability database, which was resolved in the com-
patibility evaluation to be manually created by the security expert. As an example vulnerability, we
select an insider attack where a company employee can access the Analog Input. Next, the AM in-
compatibility with profile properties was justified as being provided by the security engineer. While
we did not yet define the set of profile properties, a good set might be the array {["Knowledge"
"Resources" "Dedication"]} using a fuzzy value scheme of Low, Medium, High as valid options
for each profile property. An example set of property values for the Physical Sabotage might be
{["Knowledge=Medium" "Resources=High" "Dedication=Medium"]}. These values are also used
for the pre-configuration properties for the profiling schema. For the set of profile properties for
the six attacker types, we use the same property values as in Table 5.3. We set each attacker to be
equally likely for the set of attacker likelihoods, resulting in a value of 100%/6 = 16.6%.
The next step in verifying the integration is demonstrating the data mapping from the attacker
model back to the security review process. The expected output of the attacker model can be seen
in Table 7.5 as the SRP Destinations. The exploit sequences in the TAM are the set of the attack
pathways, the exploit mechanism, and the exploit objectives. The first output provided by the
attacker model is the attack pathway, which is a description of the attack procedure informed by
the attack path through the system, the attack results, and the used attack actions. A reasonably
expected result from the attacker model would be a multi-step attack progression where the at-
tacker performs an insider attack to gain physical access to the device, then uses physical access to
reconfigure the input wires. This data could be mapped to the TAM Attack Pathway Description
as "Physical access to power and loop cables to connect or disconnect power or communications,"
as seen in Table D.8 as the Attack Pathway Description for A01 and documented in Table 7.5. The
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second result returned to the TAM is the exploit mechanism, which is the physical access attack
pathway of A01 in D.8. The final result from the AM to the TAM is the exploit objective that the
exploit mechanism is used for. This step requires the security expert to translate the attack path
and results of the attack to one of the 28 TAM exploit objectives. In this instance, the physical
attack maps to E01 of the TAM, defined as "Component Enable/Disablement-Immediate."
7.9 Case Study Conclusions
Evaluating the execution of the integrated pair of the TAM and Deloglos’ AM identifies that the
data from the TAM effectively maps into the inputs of Deloglos’ AM, satisfying all input interface
requirements. Likewise, the outputs of Deloglos AM provide all the data required by the TAM. The
objective of integrating an attack model into the TAM was to generate exploit sequences from attack
paths. We observe that the data the attacker model takes as input from the TAM is the attack
path data. Also, the results provided to the TAM from Deloglos’ AM include the Exploit Objective
number and the applicable attack pathways, which, when entered into the TAM, constitute the
Exploit Sequence.
In conclusion, by applying our Attacker Modeling framework, we evaluated 11 attacker models
and identified two that were compatible with EPRI’s TAM. From those, we identified that one
required input data at a level of detail not readily available in the TAM, resulting in the selection
of Deloglos’ AM. We then used the AMFR to define the functional representation of the attacker
model, which was used to generate a mapping of the attack path data from the TAM to the inputs
of the AM, and then from the AM results to the TAM as exploit sequences. Finally, we integrated
the TAM and the AM. For each mapping relationship between them, we demonstrated the validity
of the integration by performing a mock execution and demonstrating that the data was provided
in a proper format to each of the mapping relationships.
The result of the attacker model evaluation and selection process has the potential to incur
scrutiny given that, from a pool of diverse attacker models, the attacker model selected was the one
that we designed early-on in the preliminary work of this dissertations. We argue, however, that
far from undermining the integrity of the Attacker Modeling Framework Integration Workflow, this
asserts its value and demonstrates a high level of fidelity. In order to understand the results of the
evaluation process, it is necessary to explicitly describe how the expert performing the integration
can influence the results.
The integration workflow begins with the expert who is performing the review defining the
problem in the security review process that the expert wants to solve via the integration of an
attacker model. This, in effect, is captured when the expert creates the SRPC in the step where the
expert defines what information is available in the SRP, the fundamental assumptions of the SRP,
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and what results are desired from the attacker model. When considering the TAM [1], there are
several different places where attacker models may be of use. For example, in the subsequent steps of
the TAM, control methods are devised to mitigate attack paths. In the review of attacker models in
Table 4.2 we noted that several attacker models produce Security Properties as a Result attribute in
the Output Interface. In Basin’s attacker model [74], this is specifically done where Basin uses known
attacks to create security protocols, which includes the creation of control methods. Moreover, the
TAM, which was designed to integrate with other products from EPRI’s body of knowledge, was
designed to accept metrics for attack criticality from the HAZCAD [35] tool. Potential applications
for attacker models can be identified in the components of the HAZCAD focused on evaluating attack
criticality levels. However, when creating the SRPC, we decided that integrating the attacker model
would be to generate exploit sequences from attack paths. While this was not intentionally selected
with our attacker model in mind, we recognize now that the theoretical foundations that motivated
this integration goal are the same theoretical foundations that motivated the original design and
development of our attacker model, which was created to automate attack path generation from
a database of attack vectors. As such, the fact that the attacker model scoring functions, which
objectively calculate filtering and similarity scores from attribute indicators, identified our attacker
model as a solution to the need we identified for the TAM shows a high degree of effectiveness by





Cyber-physical security review processes need structured methods to reason about and model the
behavior of attackers. This dissertation identified a need for structured methods to characterize
and evaluate attacker models to facilitate integrating attacker modeling techniques into security
review processes. In response to this need, we invented, developed, and presented our solution,
a generalized attacker modeling framework for characterizing and evaluating attacker models for
integration with CPS security review processes. This dissertation bridges the gap between these
fields of research. First, it characterizes and describes attacker models from the perspectives of the
experts of both fields and can adapt and expand as attacker modeling techniques evolve. Second, it
documents attacker models and security review processes in an accessible, scalable, and manageable
tabular documentation scheme that facilitates streamlined attacker model evaluation, comparison,
and selection. Finally, it provides a structured workflow for functionally integrating attacker models
into security review processes.
8.1 Observations
In Chapters 4 and 5 we presented the two composing modules of the attacker modeling frame-
work, the Attacker Model Characterization module and the Attacker Model Functional Representa-
tion module. The Attacker Model Characterization module aids in characterizing attacker models
through the developed ontology of attributes which informs their value to and compatibility with
a security review process. A significant contribution of this work was the structured review of at-
tacker modeling literature required to identify the proper set of attributes. We demonstrated that
the AMC can characterize a wide diversity of attacker models - each varying in form, function, and
purpose - and can effectively distinguish how the various attributes of each attacker model influence
compatibility and utility to different security review processes.
We also demonstrated the utility of our tabular documentation scheme which is used to capture
attribute descriptions and leverages different levels of data abstraction to facilitate reviews and
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comparisons of large numbers of attacker models. This is particularly valuable to security assessment
professionals in the industry for whom finding, understanding, and applying attacker models has
historically required such a level of effort that it inhibited the application of attacker models in the
field.
In Chapter 5 we presented the Attacker Model Functional Representation module, which uses
a generalized relationship-based component scheme to capture the functional implementation of
a diverse range of attacker models. Using our module-based tabular documentation scheme, we
demonstrated that it could represent differing attacker model behaviors, relationships, and exe-
cution models. Moreover, we identified how this module’s intermediary level of detail lends to
bridging the gap between the high-level attacker model evaluation process and the low-level process
of functionally integrating an attacker model into a security review process.
We described the application of our Attacker Modeling Framework in our attacker model Inte-
gration Workflow in Chapter 6. There, we presented our structured Integration Workflow, a scalable
process to objectively evaluate the compatibility and value of a large number of diverse attacker
models. The Integration Workflow leverages decreasing data abstraction to reduce the labor re-
quired for evaluation and make the integration workflow attractive to a commercial CPS security
audience. Finally, we described how we overcame the challenges of objectively evaluating attacker
models by using the security review process as the objective standard for attacker model evaluation.
We demonstrated a use case of the Attacker Modeling Framework and its integration workflow
using EPRI’s Technical Assessment Methodology [1] (TAM), in which we identified an application
for attacker modeling in the TAM workflow. In this use case, we demonstrated how the integration
workflow used the Attacker Model Characterization to effectively manage and filter down a diverse
database of attacker models, each varying in form, function, and purpose. We demonstrated how the
scoring methods devised in the Attacker Modeling Framework helped identify a single attacker model
which was compatible with the TAM and capable of fulfilling the requirements of the TAM. We then
demonstrated how the Attacker Model Functional Representation module captured the functional
implementation of the attacker model in enough detail to effectively map the flow of information
between the attacker model and the security review process. We then verified the effectiveness of
the integration by executing the TAM with the integrated attacker model and verifying the efficacy
of the results.
8.2 Limitations
In conclusion to this research, we identified three limitations that should be noted. First, an
objective evaluation of attacker models is difficult to develop apart from a context of application.
In this dissertation, we use the security review process as the context of application, making it the
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objective standard by which the attacker model is evaluated. As such, the selection of an attacker
model in conclusion to the evaluation part of the integration workflow does not constitute evidence
of the efficacy of the attacker model itself, but rather with respect to the security review process
under consideration.
Second, while the AMF integration workflow guides the attacker evaluation process, the value
of different attributes in different attacker models is ultimately decided by the security expert
performing the integration process. During the integration, if more than one attacker model is
proven 100% compatible with the security review process it is necessary for the expert performing
the integration workflow to evaluate individual attributes of the attacker models to decide which
is the better fit for the security review process. While the AMC aids this evaluation significantly
by identifying attributes that should be considered, the expert performing the evaluation must be
informed to be able to make a final selection. While it would be desirable to produce an objective
metric that describes the value of different attacker models, this would require a significantly more
detailed characterization of both attacker models and security review processes. While this appeals
in theory, the level of effort that would be required for such a detailed evaluation of a large number
of attacker models makes it unrealistic for real-world application.
Finally, in our AMF development workflow in Section 3.2 we described how the AMF was
developed and how it can be maintained through continued application of the development workflow.
This process requires a manual effort to analyze new attacker modeling literature and techniques
as well as a well-informed understanding of the fields of attacker modeling and security review
processes.
8.3 Future Work
The conclusion of this work lays a foundation for the beginnings of many other works. Looking at
the contributions of this dissertation to the research community, we identify several applications for
future work.
8.3.1 More Integration Case Studies
The case study in Chapter 7 demonstrated the ability of the AMF to guide a security expert through
the evaluation, selection, and integration of an attacker model into a professional security review
process, the TAM [1]. Completing additional integration case studies with alternate security review
processes may provide insights to refinements of the AMF and will further establish the efficacy and
utility of the tool.
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8.3.2 Attacker Model Validation
Our attacker modeling framework fundamentally bridges the research fields of security review pro-
cesses and attacker modeling. In order to objectively establish the efficacy of an attacker model,
one must first have a way to validate the results provided by the attacker model. In Section 2.2.4
we discuss the challenges inhibiting attacker model validation and explain how integrating attacker
models into security review processes is a promising next step in performing evidence-based vali-
dation. Indeed, the formation of this dissertation topic was partly inspired by the lack of research
available for introducing attacker modeling into security review processes for attacker model val-
idation. Historically, the consensus in the attacker modeling community has been that the effort
required inhibits the integration of attacker models into security review processes for validation
purposes. Similarly, the consensus of the CPS security community has been that the effort required
inhibits integrating attacker models to achieve greater cyber-physical security threat model assur-
ance. Our attacker modeling framework reduces the integration burden, making attacker model
integration a viable research path for attacker model validation research and security review process
threat model assurance research.
8.3.3 Attacker Modeling Framework Shared Database
The diversity in form and function of attacker models makes manually evaluating large numbers of
attacker models a daunting task. Our attacker modeling framework reduces this burden by guiding
security experts through the AMC and AMFR development process and then using the integration
workflow to compare large numbers of attacker models. Establishing a database of attacker models,
each described according to our attacker modeling framework with an AMC and AMFR, would be
valuable to both attacker modeling and security assessment communities. For the attacker modeling
community, this could serve as a unifying foundation where there is currently little consensus on best
modeling practices and could accelerate the process of attacker model refinement via feedback from
integration studies. For the security assessment community - which currently demonstrates a critical
need for objective attacker modeling practices - a database of AMFs that represents a significant
portion of current attacker modeling methods and practices would not only reduce the burden
of attacker model evaluation and integration but would also serve as a common communicating
platform between the two fields of research.
8.3.4 Evolution of Attacker Models
In Section 3.2 we describe the workflow used to determine the set of attributes that compose the
Attacker Model Characterization interfaces. In this process, we described how new attacker models
that we discovered were integrated into an existing AMC through an attribute refinement process.
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While the set of attributes we propose in this dissertation holds for the current state of attacker
modeling research, it is likely to evolve as new attacker models are developed with new forms,
functions, and purposes. As the state-of-the-art attacker modeling literature evolves, our attribute
refinement process allows the AMC to evolve in kind.
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Figure B.1 The attacker model functional representation diagram for Adepu’s attacker
model in [57].
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Table C.1 Intermediary results for the exact scoring functions for the TAM use case
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Table C.2 Intermediary results for the inclusive scoring functions for the TAM use case
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Table C.3 Integration mapping of attacker model input data from the TAM in [1] to
Deloglos’ attacker model in [5] for the use case in Chapter 7
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Table D.1 Page 1 of the cyber security data sheet for the integration use-case execution
in Section 7.8
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Table D.2 Page 2 of the cyber security data sheet for the integration use-case execution
in Section 7.8
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Table D.3 Page 3 of the cyber security data sheet for the integration use-case execution
in Section 7.8
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Table D.4 Page 4 of the cyber security data sheet for the integration use-case execution
in Section 7.8
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in Section 7.8
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in Section 7.8
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Table D.7 Page 7 of the cyber security data sheet for the integration use-case execution
in Section 7.8
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Table D.8 Page 12 of the cyber security data sheet for the integration use-case execution
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